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THE VOLCKER RULE AND EVOLVING
FINANCIAL MARKETS
CHARLES K. WHITEHEAD*
The Volcker Rule prohibits proprietary trading by banking entities—in
effect, reintroducing to the financial markets a substantial portion of the Glass-
Steagall Act’s static divide between banks and securities firms. This Article
argues that the Glass-Steagall model is a fixture of the past—a financial
Maginot Line within an evolving financial system. To be effective, new financial
regulation must reflect new relationships in the marketplace. For the Volcker
Rule, those relationships include a growing reliance by banks on new market
participants to conduct traditional banking functions.
Proprietary trading has moved to less-regulated businesses, in many cases,
to hedge funds. The result is likely to be an increase in overall risk-taking,
absent market or regulatory restraint. Ring-fencing hedge funds from other parts
of the financial system may be increasingly difficult as markets become more
interconnected. For example, new capital markets instruments—such as credit
default swaps—enable banks to outsource credit risk to hedge funds and other
market participants. Doing so permits banks to extend greater amounts of credit
at lower cost. A decline in the hedge fund industry, therefore, may prompt a
contraction in available credit by banks that are no longer able to manage risk
as effectively as before.
In short, even if proprietary trading is no longer located in banks, it may
now be conducted by less-regulated entities that affect banks and banking
activities. Banks that rely on hedge funds to manage credit risk will continue to
be exposed to proprietary trading—perhaps less directly, but now also with less
regulatory oversight, than before. The Volcker Rule, consequently, fails to reflect
an important shift in the financial markets, arguing, at least initially, for a
narrow definition of proprietary trading and a more fluid approach to
implementing the Rule.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),1 commonly known as the “Volcker Rule” (for
former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, who is credited as its chief
architect) (the Volcker Rule or the Rule), prohibits a banking entity2 from
“engag[ing] in proprietary trading” or “acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any eq-
uity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a hedge
fund or private equity fund,”3 subject to certain exceptions.4 The Rule also
limits similar activities by certain systemically important non-bank financial
institutions.5
1 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111–203, § 619, 24 Stat. 1376 (2010) (Dodd-Frank Act).
2 “Banking entity” is defined in section 13(h)(1) of the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 (2010) (BHA), as amended by section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The term includes any
insured depository institution (other than certain limited purpose trust institutions), any com-
pany that controls an insured depository institution, any company that is treated as a bank
holding company for purposes of section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978 (see 12
U.S.C. § 3106), and any affiliate of any of the foregoing. Subsequent regulations are expected
to further clarify the definition. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOM-
MENDATIONS ON PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH
HEDGE FUNDS & PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 68–69 (2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/Documents/Volcker%20sec%20%20619%20study%20final%201%2018%2011%20
rg.pdf (study of the Volcker Rule mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, including a recommenda-
tion that the agencies charged with clarifying terms in the Volcker Rule provide definitions
consistent with congressional intent) [hereinafter FSOC STUDY].
3 Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, § 13(a)(1) (amending the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West 2010)); see also infra notes 39–48 and accompanying text. R
4 Certain proprietary trading activities are still permitted under the Rule, Dodd-Frank Act
sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)—including trading in U.S. government securities, id. sec. 619,
§ 13(d)(1)(A), market-making, id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(B), and hedging to mitigate risk, id.
sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(C)—although the full scope of the permitted activities remains to be final-
ized. See FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 16; see also Public Input for the Study Regarding the R
Implementation of the Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Relationships with
Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,758, 61,759–60 (proposed Oct. 6,
2010) (soliciting comments on provisions of the Volcker Rule, including permitted activities)
[hereinafter FSOC, Public Input]. A discussion of permitted market-making and hedging ac-
tivities appears infra at notes 54–58 and accompanying text. Proprietary trading conducted R
solely outside the United States by an entity that is not directly or indirectly controlled by a
U.S. bank or systemically important firm is excluded from the Volcker Rule. Dodd-Frank Act
sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(H). The Rule also authorizes regulators to carve-out trading activities if
they “promote and protect the safety and soundness of” the firm and U.S. financial stability.
Id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(J). An otherwise permitted activity, however, is still prohibited if it
will result in “a material conflict of interest” with clients or “a material exposure to high-risk
assets or high-risk trading strategies.” Id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(2)(A); see also infra notes 49–52 R
and accompanying text. Permitted activities may be subject to additional capital requirements
and other limitations if determined to be “appropriate to protect the safety and soundness” of
the firms engaged in such activities. Id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(3); see also infra note 53 and accom- R
panying text.
5 See 156 CONG. REC. S5894 (daily ed. Jul. 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley)
(describing the rationale behind the Dodd-Frank Act, including subjecting nonbank financial
institutions to oversight by the Federal Reserve Board), [hereinafter Merkley Statement]; see
also Definitions of “Predominantly Engaged in Financial Activities” and “Significant” Non-
bank Financial Company and Bank Holding Company, 76 Fed. Reg. 7,731, 7,732–33 (pro-
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Why restrict proprietary trading? The answer is far from apparent. Sen-
ator Jeff Merkley, a co-sponsor of the Senate version of the Volcker Rule,
placed “blame [for the financial crisis] squarely on proprietary trading,”
citing a Group of Thirty study headed by Chairman Volcker.6 That statement
contrasts with Chairman Volcker’s own view that “proprietary trading in
commercial banks was . . . not central” to the crisis.7 As U.S. Treasury Sec-
retary Timothy Geithner separately testified, “most of the losses that were
material . . . did not come from [proprietary trading] activities.”8 Rather,
according to Secretary Geithner, many of the most significant losses arose
from traditional, bank-like extensions of credit—especially loans related to
real estate.9
The evidence regarding proprietary trading is mixed10—but the Rule’s
ultimate intention was less to cure a particular cause of the financial crisis
posed Feb. 11, 2011). The Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the newly created Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC) to designate systemically important non-bank financial institutions
for heightened regulation by the Federal Reserve Board. Firms are included “if the Council
determines that material financial distress . . . , or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration,
interconnectedness, or mix of the [firm’s] activities . . . , could pose a threat to the financial
stability of the United States.” Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a)(1); see also Authority to Require
Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 76 Fed. Reg. 4,555,
4,559–60 (proposed Jan. 26, 2011) (describing proposed criteria to be used in determining
whether to subject a nonbank financial firm to Federal Reserve Board supervision and stan-
dards). The limitation on proprietary trading and investing in any hedge fund or private equity
fund will be implemented through capital requirements and quantitative limits imposed by the
Federal Reserve Board. See Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, §§ 13(a)(2), 13(b)(2).
6 See Merkley Statement, supra note 5, at S5894; see also GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL R
REFORM—A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 27 (Jan. 15, 2009) (noting the “unantici-
pated and unsustainably large losses in proprietary trading” leading up to the financial crisis).
Senator Merkley and co-sponsor Senator Carl Levin also noted the “distort[ion caused] by
proprietary trading practices” on the U.S. financial markets. See Press Release, Sens. Merkley
and Levin, Senators Call on Regulators to Implement Strong Merkley-Levin Provisions, (Oct.
28, 2010), http://merkley.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=BE745FF9-1820-43DF-97
8E-35809510CBAC (asserting that proprietary trading helped distort the financial markets by
encouraging excessive risk-taking among financial firms and fostering a “casino-like” culture
amongst market participants) [hereinafter Senators Call]; see also FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, R
at 2 (noting that, following passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, a number of banking entities
closed proprietary trading, hedge fund, and private equity fund businesses “that were a source
of losses during the crisis”).
7 See Kim Dixon & Karey Wutkowski, Volcker: Proprietary Trading Not Central to Cri-
sis, REUTERS, Mar. 30, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/30/us-financial-regula
tion-volcker-idUSTRE62T56420100330 (reporting that Chairman Volcker, although still sup-
porting the ban on proprietary trading, conceded it was not central to the financial crisis).
8 See Hearing Before the Congressional Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony
of Sec. of Treasury Timothy Geithner), available at http://cop.senate.gov/hearings/library/hear-
ing-091009-geithner.cfm (testifying about the causes of the financial crisis before the Congres-
sional Oversight Panel).
9 See id.
10 There is evidence that bank losses resulted primarily from a drop in the value of long-
term investments—namely, mortgage-backed securities that banks chose to hold to maturity
rather than trade—as well as collateralized debt obligations they repurchased from off-bal-
ance-sheet funding vehicles. See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES 173 (2010) (noting that
the tendency of banks to hold mortgage-backed securities, rather than the speculative trading
of those securities, resulted in banks suffering losses); Michael Mckenzie, ‘Super-senior’ CDO
Investors Flex Their Muscles, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2008, available at http://us.ft.com/ftgate
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and more to champion the populist view that commercial banking should be
separated from investment banking, increasingly comprised of proprietary
trading and principal investments.11 The Volcker Rule, in effect, was moti-
vated by a desire to return to a traditional banking model—to create a regu-
latory divide,12 much like the Glass-Steagall Act had before its repeal in
way/superpage.ft?news_id=fto041420081618488777 (reporting that banks often remained
holders of the super-senior tranches of many collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) because
they chose to hold the securities when they were issued or they were forced to repurchase them
from off-balance sheet vehicles when their value declined). Others have argued, however, that
proprietary trading contributed substantially to the losses that large commercial banks suffered.
See, e.g., Matthew Richardson et al., Large Banks and the Volcker Rule, in REGULATING WALL
STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 181,
202–03 (Thomas F. Cooley et al. eds., 2011) (analyzing the 2009 balance sheets of the four
largest U.S. banks and finding heavy concentrations of asset-backed securities that dramati-
cally affected those banks’ ability to withstand a financial downturn); James Crotty et al.,
Proprietary Trading is a Bigger Deal than Many Bankers and Pundits Claim, POLICY NOTES
(Pol. Econ. Research Inst., Amherst, Mass.), Feb. 8, 2010, at 2, available at http://www.peri.
umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/other_publication_types/SAFERbriefs/SAFER_note15.pdf (noting
that proprietary trading was harmful to banks because, during the period leading up to the
financial crisis, many banks became overly dependent on proprietary trading for revenues).
Recent disclosures by Goldman Sachs suggest that, in some cases, the magnitude of the losses
may have been significant. See Francesco Guerrera & Kara Scannell, Goldman Reveals Fresh
Crisis Losses, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2011, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f1dcbf2e-1f
56-11e0-8c1c-00144feab49a.html#axzz1D7KF2rY8 (reporting that Goldman Sachs, after re-
vealing an additional $5 billion in investment losses, has disclosed a total of $13.5 billion in
losses stemming from the recent financial crisis). Part of the discrepancy may turn on what is
meant by proprietary trading. Short-term trading, which is what the Volcker Rule addresses,
may have been less of a concern than longer-term holdings of risky asset-backed securities.
See Richardson et al., supra, at 203–04 (linking bank losses in the recent financial crisis to the
banks’ strategy of holding mortgage-backed securities as long-term investments); see also Tom
Braithwaite, Volcker Takes Aim at Long-Term Investments, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, available
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a03c58c-242a-11e0-a89a-00144feab49a.html#axzz1D7KF2rY8
(noting Chairman Volcker’s view that Congress, in passing new financial regulation, is not
sufficiently regulating banks’ longer-term investment activities). Going forward, however, the
prohibition on proprietary trading is likely to result in a significant loss of bank revenues.
Analysts predict that the Volcker Rule will cost Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley approxi-
mately fourteen percent of their estimated earnings in 2012. See Aaron Luchetti & Victoria
McGrane, Broad Tack Expected in Implementing Volcker Rule, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2011,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487039591045760816526577536
90.html (describing the costs imposed by the Volcker Rule, including a reduction in overall
earnings and the departure of talented traders and other personnel).
11 See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL 86–87 (2011) (noting that, due to
changes in market practices and technology, proprietary trading has become crucial to invest-
ment banking). Investment banking revenues had moved away from traditional underwriting
and were increasingly tied to trading and principal investments. See Fin. Crisis Inquiry
Comm’n, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 65–66 (2011), http://c0182732.cdn1.cloud
files.rackspacecloud.com/fcic_final_report_full.pdf.
12 See Merkley Statement, supra note 5, at S5894. Some have characterized proprietary R
trading leading up to the crisis as “a mainstay” business of the largest commercial banks.
Consequently, the restriction on proprietary trading was understood to effectively separate a
significant portion of investment banking from commercial banking. See SKEEL, supra note 11, R
at 87. In addition to the Volcker Rule, the Dodd-Frank Act provides that no federal assistance,
including access to Federal Reserve funding and FDIC insurance, may be provided to a
“swaps entity,” which includes a swaps dealer, commonly referred to as the “Swap Pushout
Rule.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
§§ 716(a)–(b), 24 Stat. 1376 (2010). The effect of the Swap Pushout Rule is to “push out” the
swaps trading business from many commercial banks, even though—unlike the Volcker Rule,
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1999.13 The Rule’s proponents argued that proprietary trading had distracted
banks from their fiduciary obligations to clients,14 as well as from their core
function of “safe[ly] and sound[ly providing] long-term credit to families
and business enterprises.”15 Traders, instead, benefited from the low-cost,
government-subsidized funding of short-term, “speculative activities” that
were “far better suited for other areas of the financial markets.”16 By remov-
ing proprietary trading from banking entities, the Rule’s proponents expected
utility services, such as taking deposits and making loans, to once again
dominate the commercial banking business.17
This Article questions whether the Volcker Rule properly takes account
of change in the financial markets. In particular, it argues that the Glass-
Steagall model reflected in the Volcker Rule is a fixture of the past—a finan-
cial Maginot Line18 within an evolving financial system.19 To be effective,
which prohibits proprietary trading altogether—swaps trading is still permitted by bank affili-
ates. Id. § 716(c). Swaps entered into for hedging and other similar risk mitigating activities
are not subject to the Swap Pushout Rule. Id. § 716(d). The cost of trading for affected banks
is likely to increase due to new regulation that, among other things, takes into account the
financial strength of the newly-created swaps entity. Id. § 716(k).
13 The relevant provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act appeared in the Banking Act of 1933
§§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (seventh), 377, 378(a), 78 (2006); see also Alan E. Sorcher
& Satish M. Kini, Does the Term “Bank Broker-Dealer” Still Have Meaning?, 6 N.C. BANK-
ING INST. 227, 242–43 (2002) (describing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s purpose, mechanical
operation, and interaction with prior banking regulation). The barrier between commercial and
investment banking was largely repealed by the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999,
also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09, 6821–27 (2006).
14 See FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 48–49 (noting that combining traditional banking R
and proprietary trading within one institution creates potential conflicts of interest, especially
if loan-related information is transmitted to trading desks); Dixon & Wutkowski, supra note 7. R
15 Merkley Statement, supra note 5, at S5894. R
16 Paul Volcker, Op-Ed, How to Reform our Financial System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010,
at WK11 (arguing that, due to their importance to the general economy, banks should not bear
the additional risks associated with proprietary trading); see also Letter to the Editor, Congress
Should Implement the Volcker Rule for Banks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2010, at A18 (arguing that
commercial banks’ access to public support should limit their ability to “engage in essentially
speculative activity unrelated to essential bank services”—in a letter authored by five former
U.S. Treasury Secretaries in support of the Volcker Rule). Government subsidies include the
ability to access Federal Reserve funds to temporarily cover shortfalls in liquidity. See Mark E.
Van Der Weide & Satish M. Kini, Subordinated Debt: A Capital Markets Approach to Bank
Regulation, 41 B.C. L. REV. 195, 204–05 (2000) (describing the three essential elements of the
federal “safety net,” including federal insurance of bank deposits, access to the Federal Re-
serve’s discount window, and access to the Federal Reserve’s payment system). In addition,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance protects depositors against losses,
currently up to $250,000. See Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U.
L. REV. 1, 14 (2010) (noting that, in response to the financial crisis, the maximum insurable
amount for each deposit account was raised from $100,000 to $250,000) [hereinafter White-
head, Reframing].
17 See Merkley, Statement, supra note 5, at S5894; see also SKEEL, supra note 11, at 86. R
18 See infra note 182 and accompanying text. The Maginot Line was a line of fortifications R
and other defenses that France constructed along its borders with Germany during the period
before World War II. The fortification was based on the success of static, defensive combat in
World War I and was intended to provide time for the French army to mobilize in the event of
attack. It ultimately proved to be ineffective in World War II, as motorized elements of the
German army were able to flank the Maginot Line and proceed directly into France. See Irving
M. Gibson, The Maginot Line, 17 J. MODERN HISTORY 130, 141–46 (1945).
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new financial regulation must reflect new relationships in the marketplace.
For the Volcker Rule, those relationships include a growing reliance by
banks on new market participants to conduct traditional banking functions.
By failing to do so, the Volcker Rule’s static approach to regulating banks
may prove to be ineffective. Worse still, as illustrated below, it may have the
unintended effect of causing hedge funds20 to increase risk-taking at a time
when banks have come to rely on them to help manage credit exposure.21
As a starting point, what will happen to proprietary trading? It could
simply decline, but more likely, it will move to less-regulated businesses—
in many cases, hedge funds22—that are likely to then incur greater risk.23
19 See Whitehead, Reframing, supra note 16, at 2–5 (describing broad changes in the fi- R
nancial markets relating to market participants and financial instruments).
20 There is no standard definition of “hedge fund,” although a distinctive feature is an
organizational structure that helps align shareholder and manager interests and the payment to
managers of significant performance-related fees that aim to maximize the fund’s risk-adjusted
returns. Those returns often rely on substantial borrowings, derivatives, and complex invest-
ment strategies. See TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. SEC. COMM’N, CONSULTATION
REPORT: HEDGE FUNDS OVERSIGHT 6–9 (Mar. 2009), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/
pdf/IOSCOPD288.pdf (providing a list of some of the principal characteristics used by the
International Organization of Securities Commissions to determine whether an entity ought to
be considered a hedge fund). In addition, hedge funds and their advisers have historically been
subject to minimal regulation—often being defined by reference to the federal securities laws
from which they were exempt. See Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 172, 201–16 (2008) (explaining why the structure and operation of modern
hedge funds are incompatible with the regulatory regimes under which, but for their unique
structure, they would normally need to operate); Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate
Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV.
975, 979–83 (2006) (describing the more common structural components of hedge funds and
how they assist hedge funds in avoiding more stringent regulation). That regulation, princi-
pally by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has increased somewhat following
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. See infra notes 163–70 and accompanying text, R
21 There is a question, which I do not address in this Article, about whether prohibiting
banks from engaging in risky activities necessarily increases bank safety. Even “safer” activi-
ties can expose a bank to significant risk. Traditional bank lending, for example, can be quite
risky if banks choose to extend, and then hold, unsecured “covenant-lite” loans to lower-
quality borrowers. See RAJAN, supra note 10, at 173; Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of R
Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 676
(2009) (noting that increased default rates for loans with minimal covenant levels reflected the
limited protection for lenders) [hereinafter Whitehead, Evolution].
22 Proprietary traders from Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley have already moved to
hedge funds. See Sam Jones, More Goldman Traders to Exit for Funds, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2011, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1d8d8836-1c39-11e0-9b56-00144feab49a.html#
axzz1BxvAoR4p (reporting that senior members of Goldman Sachs’ last big proprietary trad-
ing team left to launch a private hedge fund); Aaron Lucchetti, Morgan Stanley Team to Exit in
Fallout from Volcker Rule, WALL ST. J., Jan 11, 2011, at C1 (reporting that Morgan Stanley’s
proprietary trading unit will leave Morgan Stanley to form an independent trading firm); see
also Private Equity Groups Diversify, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2010, available at http://www.ft.
com/cms/s/0/aa371bae-0c61-11e0-8408-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1BbbTf1cN (reporting that
private equity firms are capitalizing on the forced divestiture of proprietary trading units by
purchasing stakes in newly-created funds launched by those units).
23 Financial market participants have raised similar concerns. See Francesco Guerrera &
Gillian Tett, Goldman President Warns on Bank Rules, FT.COM (Jan. 26, 2011), http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f9753506-2990-11e0-bb9b-00144feab49a,s01=1.html#axzz1F56PbpaL
(reporting the view of a senior executive at Goldman Sachs that increased regulation of banks
may decrease financial stability as risky activities move from banks to hedge funds and other
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That risk can be mitigated if traders are subject to a market discipline that
takes account of the full cost of their activities. The financial markets, how-
ever, are unlikely to compel traders to do so—a negative externality, as mar-
ket participants focus instead on their investors’ returns rather than on the
broader consequences of hedge fund failure.24
Such failure can be industry-wide. Hedge funds can be affected at the
same time and in the same way following large adverse shocks to asset and
hedge fund liquidity, irrespective of management style.25 Greater coordina-
tion, in turn, can magnify any resulting loss of portfolio value.26 Moreover,
simply ring-fencing hedge funds may be difficult as markets become in-
creasingly interconnected. Hedge funds, for example, are significant partici-
pants in the credit default swaps (CDS) market, which banks and other
financial intermediaries use to manage and transfer credit risk.27 Doing so,
less-regulated entities); Francesco Guerrera, Monsters that Lurk in the Shadows of Wall St.,
FT.COM, Mar. 7, 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/72503e60-48dd-11e0-af8c-00144feab49a.
html#axzz1G0q8jHUQ (quoting Vikram Pandit, Citigroup CEO, as warning, “Shifting risk
into unregulated or differently regulated sectors won’t make the banking system safer.”). FDIC
Chairperson Sheila Bair made the same point about the Swap Pushout Rule in an April 30,
2010, letter to Senators Christopher Dodd and Blanche Lincoln. See Sheila Bair Letter to Dodd
and Lincoln re: Derivative Regulations, THE BIG PICTURE (May 3, 2010, 11:15 AM), http://
www.ritholtz.com/blog/2010/05/55714/ (arguing that forcing banks to move activities to less-
regulated entities might reduce financial stability because those entities would be subject to
lower levels of regulation and oversight). Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke raised the
same concern in a May 12, 2010, letter to Senator Dodd. See Letter from Ben Bernanke,
Chairman, Fed. Reserve, to Sen. Christopher Dodd (May 12, 2010), http://americanactionnet
work.org/files/Bernanke%20derivatives%20letter.pdf?phpMyAdmin=yVaoFIsOJaixGsCDQK
evn%2Cgw%2CQ9 (making a similar point as Chairperson Blair).
24 See Whitehead, Reframing, supra note 16, at 15 (noting that a firm’s managers, share- R
holders, and customers are unlikely to properly consider or price the costs associated with the
firm’s assumption of high levels of risk); see also PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN.
MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
31 (1999), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedge
fund.pdf (noting that individual firms limit risk-taking to protect themselves, not the system as
a whole).
25 See Nicole M. Boyson et al., Hedge Fund Contagion and Liquidity Shocks, 65 J. FIN.
1789, 1791–92 (2010) (linking contagion in the hedge fund industry to liquidity shocks); see
also infra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. R
26 See Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 346–52
(2011) (noting that increased coordination can cause independent market participants to re-
spond to external events in similar ways which, in the case of a market downturn, can drive
down asset prices and increase market volatility); see also infra note 160 and accompanying R
text.
27 See Whitehead, Evolution, supra note 21, at 657–58; see also infra notes 139–46, 151 R
and accompanying text. A credit default swap (CDS) is a type of derivative that permits a
counterparty to a swap contract to buy or sell all or a portion of the credit risk tied to a loan or
bond. The CDS customer pays the “writer” of the swap a periodic fee in exchange for a
contingent payment in the event of a credit default. If a credit event occurs, typically involving
default by the borrower, the CDS writer must pay the counterparty an amount sufficient to
make it whole or purchase the referenced loan or bond at par. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr.,
The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 947–52 (2009) (providing general overview of
CDS and their increasing importance in managing risk); see also MORTON GLANTZ, MANAG-
ING BANK RISK: AN INTRODUCTION TO BROAD-BASE CREDIT ENGINEERING 531–49 (2003);
Blythe Masters & Kelly Bryson, Credit Derivatives and Loan Portfolio Management, in
HANDBOOK OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES 43–85 (Jack Clark Francis et al. eds., 1999).
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for banks, increases the amount of capital available for lending.28 The Dodd-
Frank Act limits direct counterparty credit risk by requiring banks and hedge
funds, with certain exceptions, to centrally clear standardized swaps.29 It
does not, however, address the impact on banks if hedge funds, as a group,
are unable to manage bank-originated risk or can do so only at higher cost.
The effect can be significantly greater than the failure of any one fund. It can
also ripple through to other parts of the financial system, resulting in a drop
in available credit if banks—no longer able to rely on risk-taking by hedge
funds—must then limit the amount of new loans they can extend.30
In short, even if proprietary trading is no longer located in banks, it may
now be conducted by less-regulated entities that affect banks and banking
activities.31 Banks that rely on hedge funds to manage credit risk will con-
tinue to be exposed to proprietary trading—perhaps less directly, but now
also with less regulatory oversight, than before. The Volcker Rule, conse-
quently, fails to reflect an important shift in the financial markets: the trans-
fer, in this illustration, of a traditional bank function to new, less-regulated
market participants.
Part II describes the Volcker Rule and its prohibition on proprietary
trading. It also illustrates some of the ambiguities that must still be ad-
dressed in implementing the Rule. Part III explains how change in the finan-
cial markets has enabled new market participants to replicate products and
services provided by traditional intermediaries. Part IV then focuses on the
role of hedge funds in the CDS market—in effect, assuming risks tradition-
ally managed within banks and other intermediaries, but without the same
level of regulatory oversight. Part V, in turn, briefly considers the resulting
28 See Whitehead, Evolution, supra note 21, at 658 (explaining that banks, by being able to R
better manage risk through securitization, are able to reduce overall capital costs and may
permit borrowers to enjoy a portion of the savings); see also infra note 147 and accompanying R
text.
29 Banks and hedge funds that enter into standardized swaps with each other will generally
be required to place those swaps through a derivatives clearing organization (DCO). Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, sec. 723(a)(3),
§ 2, 24 Stat. 1376 (amending the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2010))
(Dodd-Frank Act). DCOs may help limit direct credit exposure. A standardized CDS between
two parties could be cleared and settled through a DCO after the trade is agreed—in effect,
making the DCO the middleman in the trade between the two of them. The DCO must collect
margin as well as implement other risk control mechanisms to limit its exposure to default,
minimizing the risk of direct credit exposure between the two counterparties. Id. § 723(c); see
also Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce
Counterparty Risk? 2–5 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Gov., Working Paper No. 46, 2010), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/~duffie/DuffieZhu.pdf (concluding that the effectiveness of central-
ized clearing depends on whether the number of clearing participants is sufficiently large rela-
tive to the aggregate exposure on the derivatives being cleared).
30 See Whitehead, Reframing, supra note 16, at 38 (noting that change in the CDS market R
has made it more difficult for banks to ensure that entities to whom the risk is outsourced—
often, hedge funds—are properly doing so); see also infra notes 152–62 and accompanying R
text.
31 The same may be true for systemically important non-bank financial firms that become
subject to heightened regulation. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. R
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implications of change in the financial markets for implementing the Volcker
Rule. It suggests that a static business model—such as contemplated by the
Rule—does not properly account for that change, arguing, at least initially,
for a narrow interpretation of the Rule and reliance on more fluid means to
regulate risk-taking, such as imposing new capital requirements.
II. THE VOLCKER RULE
The Volcker Rule prohibits a banking entity from engaging in proprie-
tary trading or investing in, sponsoring, or having certain other relationships
with hedge funds or private equity funds.32 It also provides for additional
capital requirements, quantitative limits, and other restrictions to be imposed
on systemically important nonbank financial firms, supervised by the Fed-
eral Reserve, that engage in such activities.33 To provide greater definition,
the newly-created Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was di-
rected to undertake a study of the Volcker Rule, including recommendations
regarding its implementation (the FSOC Study or the Study).34 The Study
was published on January 18, 2011;35 and, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act,
implementing regulations must be adopted within nine months after that date
(no later than October 18, 2011).36 Firms will initially have up to two years
to comply with the Volcker Rule after implementing rules are issued and
may, in total, have up to six years to comply with the new requirements.37
32 See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. This Article focuses primarily on the R
Volcker Rule’s direct prohibition of proprietary trading by banking entities, rather than on its
regulation of banking entity investments in, and relationships with, hedge funds and private
equity funds. The Volcker Rule defines a “hedge fund” and a “private equity fund” broadly to
be any entity that would be an investment company, as defined in the Investment Company
Act of 1940, but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act, or any similar funds as the appropri-
ate federal banking agencies, the SEC, or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) may, by rule, determine should be treated as a hedge fund or private equity fund.
Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 619, § 13(h)(2). The limitation on investing in or sponsoring a hedge
fund or private equity fund has three principal purposes—to ensure banking entities cannot
circumvent the Volcker Rule, to confine private fund activities to customer-related services,
and to eliminate incentives for banks to bail out funds they sponsor or in which they have
significantly invested. See FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 56. More tailored definitions have R
been left to later rule-making. See id. at 56–70 (describing factors to be considered in regulat-
ing banking entity investments in, and relationships with, hedge funds and private equity
funds); see also 75 Fed. Reg. 61,758, supra note 4, at 61,758–59 (soliciting comments on R
provisions of the Volcker Rule, including the definitions of “hedge fund” and “private equity
fund”).
33 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. R
34 Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, § 13(b)(1); see also FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 8–9 R
(describing the statutory mandate and objectives of the FSOC Study).
35 The full text of the FSOC Study can be found at the corresponding hyperlink, supra
note 2. R
36 Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, § 13(b)(2)(A).
37 The Volcker Rule takes effect upon the earlier of twelve months after the issuance of
final implementing rules and two years after the date the Volcker Rule was enacted (July 21,
2012). Id. sec. 619, § 13(c)(1). Banks then have up to two years to comply, and nonbank
financial firms have up to two years to comply after becoming subject to the Volcker Rule.
During that time, they can wind down, sell, or otherwise conform their activities, investments,
\\jciprod01\productn\H\hlb\1-1\HLB107.txt unknown Seq: 10 22-JUN-11 15:37
48 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 1
Authority to adopt the regulations is divided among the principal federal
financial regulators, under coordination of the Treasury Secretary as FSOC
Chairman.38
As of this Article’s publication, the core regulations implementing the
Volcker Rule have not been publicly released for comment. The FSOC
Study, however, provides a general idea of what they are likely to address,
as well as the open issues regulators must resolve.39 Chief among them is
defining “proprietary trading.”40 The Dodd-Frank Act defines it as engaging
as principal for a “trading account . . . in any transaction to purchase or sell,
or otherwise acquire or dispose of any security, any derivative, any contract
of sale of a commodity for future delivery, any option on [any of the forego-
ing], or any other security or financial instrument” as determined by the
appropriate federal regulator.41 “Trading account,” in turn, is defined as
“any account used for acquiring or taking positions in securities and [finan-
cial] instruments . . . for the purpose of selling in the near term (or otherwise
with the intent to resell in order to profit from short-term price movements)”
and other accounts the regulators may identify.42
The definitions raise some critical questions, which the Study fails to
fully resolve. For example, trading activity can vary among markets and by
asset class, and so what constitutes a “near term” or “short-term” transac-
tion for one instrument may be quite different for another.43 How, if at all,
should the Volcker Rule distinguish among them? The Study’s response is
and relationships to the Volcker Rule’s requirements. Id. sec. 619, § 13(c)(2). The Federal
Reserve Board can, in its discretion, extend the compliance period for one year at a time, up to
three years in total. Id. For investments in illiquid funds, the Board may grant a single exten-
sion of up to five years. Id. sec. 619, § 13(c)(3). During the transition period, affected firms
may be subject to additional capital and other requirements. Id. sec. 619, § 13(c)(5). The Fed-
eral Reserve Board has adopted final rules implementing the Volcker Rule’s conformance pe-
riod requirements. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.181, 225.182.
38 The regulators charged with implementing the Volcker Rule are the Federal Reserve
Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, the SEC, and the CFTC. Each
agency must consult and coordinate with the others in order to assure comparability and con-
sistency across the new regulations. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, § 13(b)(2)(B)(ii), (iii).
39 The FSOC Study does so principally through ten recommendations, including recom-
mendations that regulators (i) require banking entities to sell or wind down impermissible
trading desks and divest themselves of impermissible positions, (ii) perform a supervisory
review of trading activity to distinguish between proprietary trading and permitted activities,
and (iii) require banking entities to implement a mechanism to identify to regulators which
trades are customer-initiated and which are not. See FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 3. R
40 See Richardson et al., supra note 10, at 201–04 (noting that a number of normal bank- R
ing activities involve banks trading for their own account, even though the activities are ulti-
mately intended to meet client needs).
41 Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, § 13(h)(4).
42 Id. sec. 619, § 13(h)(6).
43 Limiting the Volcker Rule to “short-term” transactions is a significant weakness.
Longer-term commitments may not be covered—and those transactions are reported to have
been a significant source of banking losses during the recent financial crisis. See supra note
10; see also Francesco Guerrera et al., Wall Street to Sidestep “Volcker Rule,” FT.COM, Nov. R
10, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3d49f12e-ed03-11df-9912-00144feab49a.html#axzz1F5
M56N00 (reporting that banks may avoid the Volcker Rule’s prohibitions by engaging in
longer-term “principal investing”).
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open-ended, cautioning regulators to consider the characteristics, liquidity,
and trading volumes of each relevant market, but without defining how to do
so.44 It also cautions that measures used to detect impermissible activities are
likely to vary based upon the assets and activity in question, requiring a
tailored approach to implementing the Rule’s prohibitions.45
In addition, different firms may employ different trading strategies, so
that what would be considered proprietary at one firm may not be the same
at another. A firm may also vary its approach to trading based on changes in
the marketplace. A longer-term investment, for example, may be resold
quickly in the face of an increasingly volatile market. How can regulators
distinguish between changes in strategy and prohibited transactions? Here,
the FSOC Study provides clearer guidance, but still leaves important details
to later rule-making. The Study recommends new rules that impose affirma-
tive obligations on the board and CEO, among other things, to implement
comprehensive compliance programs that facilitate monitoring and supervi-
sion.46 Banks must also develop quantitative measures to assist in identifying
which activities are permissible and which are not.47 Trading metrics, the
Study notes, can provide a useful guide, but may not be predictive of which
trades are the riskiest or whether the bank is engaged in impermissible activ-
ity. Consequently, the new measures—rather than being dispositive of com-
pliance—may simply trigger a heightened scrutiny, as well as a “regular
dialogue” between regulators and banks.48
Exemptions from the Volcker Rule are the other side of the coin. The
Dodd-Frank Act carves out permitted activities that would otherwise be con-
sidered proprietary trading.49 Yet, even those activities are prohibited if they
would result in a material conflict of interest with clients or materially ex-
pose a banking entity to high-risk assets or trading strategies.50 The FSOC
Study includes factors that regulators can consider, but with minimal detail.
44 See FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 24–25. The Study also recommends the use of vari- R
ous metrics to distinguish between permissible activities and proprietary trading. See infra
notes 62–66 and accompanying text. R
45 See FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 37 (conceding that quantitative metrics, although R
helpful in identifying impermissible trading, will invariably produce both “false positives” and
“false negatives”). The FSOC Study notes that the Volcker Rule’s language regarding short-
term price movements is similar to accounting and other banking standards used to identify
short-term assets. For example, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) differenti-
ates short-term “held for trading” assets from those “held to maturity” or “available for sale.”
The Study cautions regulators who incorporate the FASB standard into the Volcker Rule to
consider how a change in accounting designation could affect an entity’s ability to avoid the
prohibition against proprietary trading. See id. at 25.
46 See id. at 33–36 (noting that requiring banks to adopt internal trading controls will
produce optimally tailored regulation that properly reflects differences across firms and across
different trading units within the same firm).
47 See infra notes 62–66 and accompanying text. R
48 See FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 37, 45 (suggesting that regular dialogue with a R
bank’s managers and other control personnel will assist regulators in understanding specific
trading activity by each bank).
49 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. R
50 See FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 48–49. R
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The Study, for example, notes that concerns over conflicts are “elevated”
when instruments are complex, highly structured or opaque, illiquid or hard-
to-value, require coordination across multiple business units within a bank,
or involve significant information asymmetries. In addition, assets or strate-
gies may be high risk if they involve new products with rapid growth, em-
bedded leverage, high volatility, or assets whose values cannot be externally
priced or effectively hedged.51 Identifying which activities fall within these
criteria is left to regulators, who may adjust their requirements over time
based on information they receive as supervisors and examiners.52 Likewise,
reflecting the potential for heightened risk, permitted activities may be sub-
ject to additional capital requirements and other limitations to be set by fu-
ture regulation.53
Among the permitted activities, market-making and hedging are per-
haps the most important.54 Neither term, however, is defined.55 Drawing a
line between speculation and market-making may be particularly difficult.
This is worrisome because market-making is essential to capital-raising,
helping to fill a temporal gap between sellers and buyers of financial assets.
It mirrors a classic bank function—providing liquidity to lenders without
affecting borrowers’ access to a stable source of capital—but relying on the
capital markets rather than traditional banking channels. To do so, banks
intermediate between clients seeking to buy or sell financial assets and those
wishing to sell or buy the same assets. A customer can sell assets immedi-
ately to a market-maker or postpone her sale until she locates an eager
buyer. The risk, of course, is that the price may move against the seller while
she waits. Market-makers are prepared to bear that risk—offering immediate
liquidity, but typically at a discount from the price the seller might otherwise
receive in the future. The market-maker’s gross return is the difference be-
tween its purchase price and the higher price at which it later sells the assets
it holds.56 Banks, consequently, are contacted daily to trade billions of dol-
lars of financial instruments. Airlines, for example, can buy oil futures to
lock in energy prices; agribusinesses can trade weather derivatives to offset
the risk of a bad crop; and traders outside a bank can buy and sell, and
sometimes speculate in, financial assets ranging from stocks and bonds to
pork bellies and gold. Banks, as a result, may acquire inventory and maintain
risk exposures in order to meet (or anticipate) customer demand. Proprietary
51 See id. at 51 (noting that limits on high-risk activity apply on desk-, business-, and firm-
wide levels).
52 See id. at 49–51 (suggesting that, in creating new regulations, regulators must remain
focused on the need to prohibit banking entities from profiting from trading that might present
heightened conflicts of interest).
53 Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, § 13(d)(3).
54 See id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(B).
55 See FSOC, Public Input, supra note 4, at 61,759. R
56 See Sanford J. Grossman & Merton H. Miller, Liquidity and Market Structure, 43 J.
FIN. 617, 617–18 (1988) (describing the basic principles by which market-making operates);
see also infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. R
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traders, likewise, accumulate positions with the expectation of profiting from
future transactions. Identifying which trades are a part of market-making and
which are proprietary may be quite difficult—both involve principal trading
with customers or counterparties, where the firm may gain or lose as a result
of short-term changes in asset price.57
Hedging is also integral to a bank’s business. A bank may hedge its
exposure to financial instruments, including inventory from market-making.
It may also hedge interest rate and credit risk as part of its traditional lending
business. Hedging risk can be effected in a number of ways, depending on
the nature of the risk and the firm’s aggregate exposure. To do so, a bank can
buy or sell financial instruments, which may replicate (or mask) proprietary
trading. Since a direct link between risk and hedging is not always possible,
it may appear to an outsider that a legitimate hedging transaction is, in fact,
an impermissible activity. Articulating the difference, however, is left to
later rule-making.58
As noted earlier, a key recommendation of the FSOC Study is the use
of quantitative metrics—objective data points—to aid regulators in separat-
ing proprietary trading from permitted activities.59 Metrics will also help
banking entities more easily comply with the Volcker Rule, although they
leave open the risk of trading strategies that satisfy quantitative standards but
still violate the Rule’s intent. More importantly, the new metrics are likely to
require banks to change how they do business in order to comply with the
regulators’ definition of permitted activities.60 By dictating business models,
the Volcker Rule may delay the introduction of new instruments and strate-
gies that—while otherwise consistent with the Rule—extend beyond ex-
isting indicia of permissible trading, potentially slowing beneficial
innovation.61
The proposed metrics are fairly comprehensive, although regulators
may identify additional measures in the future.62 They include:
• Revenue-based metrics based on daily trading revenues and prof-
its from particular transactions, measured against historical reve-
nue trends and profits from total trading activity, including data
from other banks;63
57 See FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 18–24 (noting that current market-making often R
includes elements of proprietary trading and that, coupled with differences in market-making
for different assets and markets, delineating between permissible and impermissible trading is
challenging).
58 See id. at 20–21.
59 See id. at 37 (suggesting that the use of quantitative metrics will assist regulators in
distinguishing between permissible and impermissible activities and facilitate the comparison
of trading activity across different banks); see also supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. R
60 See FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 5–6. R
61 See id. at 26–27.
62 See id. at 6, 43.
63 See id. at 36–38.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\hlb\1-1\HLB107.txt unknown Seq: 14 22-JUN-11 15:37
52 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 1
• Revenue-to-risk metrics that measure the amount of revenue a
bank generates, and the volatility of its earnings, in relation to the
risks the bank assumes, with the expectation that permitted activ-
ities will have greater revenue-to-risk ratios than proprietary
trading;64
• Inventory metrics that assess daily trading values against the
value of assets held in inventory. Excess inventory, the FSOC
Study argues, is more likely to indicate that a trading desk is
holding an impermissible proprietary position—although the
Study also recognizes that, as a result of differences in liquidity
and complexity, values are likely to vary depending on asset class
and may need to be determined on a desk-by-desk basis;65 and
• Customer-flow metrics that compare the volume of trading from
customer orders against orders initiated by a bank trader, includ-
ing trading in order to build an inventory (against future customer
demand) or hedge an existing position. Regulators may also as-
sess customer order-flow against inventory, as well as determine
how much of a trading desk’s revenues are from customer-related
business.66
Implementing the new measures is likely to be expensive. The FSOC
Study notes that banks will be required to develop new regulatory and super-
visory tools beyond their current risk management systems.67 In addition,
banks must collect and test new data, including metrics to assess industry-
wide trading on a desk-by-desk basis, as well as comparing bank trading
with hedge fund and other proprietary operations.68 Greater detail may im-
prove the usefulness of the new measures, but doing so will also require an
assessment of different trading strategies across banks and, within banks,
across different business units.69 The FSOC Study, therefore, recommends
that each bank be required to devise its own internal program of policies,
procedures, and other controls, subject to regulatory review, in order to tailor
how the Volcker Rule is implemented.70
64 See id. at 36, 38–39.
65 See id. at 37, 39–40.
66 See id. at 37, 41.
67 See id. at 31 (noting that current risk management frameworks, because they are de-
signed principally to limit losses, will, need to be re-developed to prioritize compliance with
the Volcker Rule’s prohibitions). Regulators, as well, will need significant resources in order to
hire and train staff with quantitative and market expertise, develop and analyze data, and re-
view information in order to identify prohibited activities. See id. at 43–44.
68 See id. at 42 (noting that regulators, by increasing the diversity of data points it surveys
and collects, will have a more accurate representation of the trading activities of banking
entities).
69 See id. at 42–43 (noting that increased granularity, although preventing bank entities
from masking impermissible trading, is likely to produce false positives).
70 See id. at 33–34.
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Regulators, the FSOC Study cautions, must be “flexible and dynamic”
in implementing the Rule.71 The Study notes that “markets, products and
trading activities will continue to evolve,” reflecting change in the financial
markets over time.72 Regulation will be ineffective if it fails to take account
of that change.73 Evolution, however, is not confined to proprietary trading.
The need for flexibility may be more fundamental—reflecting new relation-
ships in the financial markets—as functions traditionally provided by banks
are now also provided by new market participants. The concern, therefore,
may extend beyond proprietary trading to whether the core of the Volcker
Rule—namely, the divide between proprietary trading and banking—itself
fails to take account of change in the financial markets. I begin to address
that question in the next Part.
III. EVOLVING FINANCIAL MARKETS
Much of U.S. financial regulation divides traditional intermediaries into
categories, as banks, thrifts, broker-dealers, insurance firms, and pension and
investment advisers.74 Those categories largely reflect the functions, prod-
ucts, and services provided by financial intermediaries in the 1930s and
1940s when many of the regulations were first introduced.75 Financial regu-
lation began to evolve in the 1950s as concerns arose that new market par-
ticipants had begun to overtake traditional intermediaries.76 Regulators, for
71 Id. at 32.
72 See id. at 26.
73 See id.
74 See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Capital Adequacy Regulation: In Search of a Ra-
tionale 3 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 03–07, 2002), available at http://fic.
wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/03/0307.pdf (noting that the mindset of the 1930s—one which
was largely informed by the Great Depression—continues to influence thinking about financial
regulatory policy); Gary Gorton, Bank Regulation When “Banks” and “Banking” Are Not the
Same, OXFORD REV. ECON POL’Y, Winter 1994, at 106, 107 (describing historical definition of
banks); Roberta S. Karmel, The Challenge to Financial Regulators Posed by Social Security
Privatization, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1043, 1056–58 (1998) (describing definitional distinctions
that control regulatory oversight); see also Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor,
United Kingdom and United States RESPONSES TO THE REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF MODERN
FINANCIAL Markets, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 317, 328–29 (2003) (noting that U.S. regulation is
largely tied to business model rather than function).
75 Types of financial intermediaries are described in Robert Charles Clark, The Federal
Income Taxation of Financial Intermediaries, 84 YALE L.J. 1603, 1605–06 (1975) (dividing
financial intermediaries into two broad types based on the source of their funding), and Howell
E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploration Essay,
77 WASH. U. L. Q. 319, 322–31 (1999) (suggesting one means to distinguish among different
financial intermediaries is through comparing degrees of diffusion and opaqueness).
76 See Franklin Allen & Anthony M. Santomero, The Theory of Financial Intermediation,
21 J. BANKING & FIN. 1461, 1464–74 (1997) (describing changes in the markets and the intro-
duction of new instruments that have increased the overall size of the financial sector, but
reduced the importance of traditional intermediaries); Richard J. Herring & Anthony M.
Santomero, What is Optimal Financial Regulation? 29–35 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working
Paper 00–34, May 1999), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/00/0034.pdf
(noting the general decline of bank financial intermediation—especially noticeable in the con-
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example, began to loosen their interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act,
largely due to the banks’ interest in offering new products and services.77
Additional changes were made in response to new market participants and
products, in some cases spurred by pressure to stay competitive,78 and in
others, in order to accommodate new financial practices.79 Traditional cate-
gories, nevertheless, continue today to frame much of U.S. financial regula-
tion,80 even though convergence in the financial markets has resulted in
similar functions, products, and services appearing across multiple
categories.81
Money market funds (MMFs) and finance companies together provide
one example. Managing credit risk is at the heart of a bank’s traditional func-
tion as an intermediary between depositors and borrowers.82 A key is its
ability to balance depositors’ interests in liquid liabilities (deposits) against
borrowers’ interests in longer-term, illiquid assets (loans), with loan portfolio
risks spread across depositors and over time.83 MMFs and finance companies
replicate that balance, but do so through the capital markets. On the deposi-
tor side, MMFs provide investors with many of the conveniences of a bank,
such as liquidity and checking services,84 by managing portfolio investments
text of business finance—resulting from technological changes, new products, and competition
from less-regulated entities).
77 See Thomas G. Fischer et al., The Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 51 TENN. L. REV. 467, 474–502 (1984) (providing a general survey of
the expansion of commercial banks into investment banking and noting the ways in which
regulators and courts interpreted that expansion); Sorcher & Kini, supra note 13, at 233–34; R
see also Richardson et al., supra note 10, at 186–91 (noting how regulators in the 1980s issued R
a number of administrative rulings that permitted banks to hold and operate wholesale securi-
ties subsidiaries).
78 See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury
Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 727, 737–38, 749 (2009) (noting that the SEC’s decision
to relax net capital rules for large investment banks was taken, in part, because of changes in
European regulation).
79 See Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revi-
sionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 728–29
(1987) (describing how the Comptroller, in response to the proliferation of shared ATMs,
altered the traditional definition of bank branches to ensure that their use was permissible).
80 As Jamie Dimon, the Chairman and CEO of J.P. Morgan Chase, has noted, “A lot of the
rules and regulations [we have] are closer to the Civil War than they are to today.” Paul
Tharp, Ben Sees Treasury as the Bank Cure, N.Y. POST, July 9, 2008, at 31.
81 See Whitehead, Reframing, supra note 16, at 21. R
82 Bert Scholtens & Dick van Wensveen, A Critique on the Theory of Financial Intermedi-
ation, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 1243, 1247–48 (2000) (noting that managing risk has always been
“the bread and butter of financial intermediaries”).
83 See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Markets, Intermediaries, and Intertem-
poral Smoothing, 105 J. POL. ECON. 523, 525 (1997) (contending that, even where a certain
risk cannot be diversified away, such risk can be averaged (or smoothed) over time, reducing
its impact); Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 405 (1983) (describing banks’ “role of turning illiquid assets
into liquid assets”); Eugene F. Fama, What’s Different About Banks?, 15 J. MONETARY ECON.
29, 34–35 (1985) (describing how banks can tailor their portfolios to reduce overall risk and
cost).
84 See Tamar Frankel, The Scope and Jurisprudence of the Investment Management Regu-
lation, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 939, 943 (2005) (noting that money market funds (MMFs), which
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against investor withdrawals.85 On the borrower side, finance companies
lend to retail and business customers,86 relying on MMFs for funding
through the sale to them of short-term commercial paper.87 The result, by
placing MMFs and finance companies together, is the functional equivalent
of deposit-taking and lending by banks.88
Market-making is another example of a traditional bank function being
executed through the capital markets.89 Most securities transactions involve a
specialized financial intermediary known as a “market-maker.” A market-
maker trades securities as principal on either side of the market—in other
words, it is both a buyer and seller of the same securities. If there are more
buyers than sellers, or vice versa, the market-maker must adjust its inventory
in response to customer demand, as well as change the bid-ask prices in
order to rebalance order flow.90 Market-makers mirror a classic bank func-
tion: both span the maturity gap between capital providers (who, as deposi-
tors or investors, expect liquidity) and capital users (who require longer-term
stability).91 There are, of course, important differences between market-mak-
ers and traditional banks. For example, a bank’s obligation is evidenced by a
contract to pay a fixed return on demand, whereas a market-maker’s obliga-
tion is typically enforced through reputation, and price is not agreed in ad-
vance. Both, however, facilitate capital-raising by providing investors with
were not subject to the interest rate caps placed on banks, were able to offer higher interest
rates to customers and, at the same time, offer services consistent with traditional banks).
85 MMFs are able to sell assets and raise money quickly, in part due to special require-
ments that impose strict standards on the credit quality and liquidity of their investment portfo-
lios. See Money Market Funds, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(3)-(4) (2008) (outlining criteria
relating to portfolio quality and diversification that MMFs must satisfy); see also REPORT OF
THE MONEY MARKET WORKING GROUP 31–39 (submitted to the Board of Governors of the
Investment Company Inst., Washington, D.C.) (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.ici.org/
pdf/ppr_09_mmwg.pdf (describing regulation of MMFs).
86 See Harvey Rosenblum et al., Banks and Nonbanks: A Run for the Money, ECON.
PERSP., May-June 1983, at 3, 3–7 (describing the inroads, as measured by increases in overall
profits attributable to financial services, made by nonfinancial companies).
87 See Jane W. D’Arista & Tom Schlesinger, The Parallel Banking System, BRIEFING PA-
PER (Econ. Policy Inst., Washington, D.C.), June 1, 1993, at 7–14 (noting that the commercial
paper market is the essential link between the borrower and depositor aspects of MMF
activity).
88 See Jonathan R. Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk: The Role of Money Market Mutual
Funds as Substitutes for Federally Insured Bank Deposits 6 (Yale Law Sch., Research Paper
No. 422, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1735008
(noting that the needs and expectations of MMF investors and commercial depositors are
roughly the same, tracking the functional similarity between the two).
89 See THE CITY UK, BOND MARKETS 2010 3 (2010), available at http://
www.thecityuk.com/media/156879/bond%20markets%202010.pdf (noting that the U.S. bond
market lacks a central exchange and instead operates through hundreds of market-makers); see
also supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. R
90 See Maureen O’Hara & George S. Oldfield, The Microeconomics of Market Making, 21
J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 361, 361 (1986).
91 See OLIVER WYMAN, THE VOLCKER RULE—CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
PROPRIETARY TRADING REGULATIONS 9 (2011), http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=
22888 (report commissioned by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association).
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liquidity—the ability to raise cash quickly—without interrupting the end-
user’s longer-term employment of capital.92
The end of Bretton Woods and the start of the OPEC oil embargo in
1973 subjected peacetime businesses to new exchange rate and energy cost
volatility. Business managers began to search for cost-effective means to
manage risk. Financial market participants saw an opportunity to profit from
the creation and trading of new financial instruments that responded to the
new demands.93 In many cases, they adopted technologies similar to those
used by (but no longer limited to) insurers and banks—namely, the pooling
and transferring of financial risk from corporate counterparties to those who,
through diversification or otherwise, could manage that risk at lower cost.94
The result was the introduction of new products and services, often repli-
cating those of traditional intermediaries, but offered by new participants or
through the capital markets.95 Over time, the growing demand for those in-
struments resulted in greater liquidity,96 which, in turn, lowered their cost97
92 See Hans R. Stoll, Alternative Views of Market Making, in MARKET MAKING AND THE
CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 67, 81–82 (Yakov Amihud et al. eds.,
1985) (noting that, from a functional standpoint, a market-maker’s services mirror those pro-
vided by financial intermediaries, such as banks, since the market-maker borrows short-term to
finance long-term investments); Thomas S.Y. Ho & Anthony Saunders, The Determinants of
Bank Interest Margins: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 16 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 581,
582–83 (1981) (noting that a major uncertainty that banks face relates to the demand for bank
loans and the supply of deposits—outflows and inflows, respectively—tending to follow inde-
pendent schedules); see also Darrel Duffie, The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks 2–4 (Bank
for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 301, 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
work301.pdf (describing depositors as individuals interested in short-term liquidity and bor-
rowers as individuals looking for longer-term finance, with banks acting as intermediators).
93 See FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND RISK SHARING
38 (1994) (explaining that the initial impetus for the creation of MMFs was banking regulation
that limited the ability of banks to increase interest rates in a rising interest rate environment);
Allen & Santomero, supra note 76, at 1479–80; Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, R
Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 231, 245–47 (2008) (stating that the growing demand for risk-management
instruments increased the liquidity of the risk markets which, in turn, lowered the instruments’
cost and permitted financial intermediaries to provide products more carefully tailored to indi-
vidual clients); James C. Van Horne, Of Financial Innovations and Excesses, 40 J. FIN. 621,
622–24 (1985) (noting that financial innovation, and the offering of new products and services,
correlate with the increased market volatility, regulatory changes, and technological improve-
ments that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s).
94 See Allen & Santomero, supra note 76, at 1479–80 (noting that, where a financial insti- R
tution is holding a transferable risk but has no comparative advantage in managing it, there is
no reason for the firm not to transfer it through the capital markets); Van Horne, supra note 93, R
at 622–28.
95 See Whitehead, Reframing, supra note 16, at 36–40. R
96 The Black-Scholes options pricing formula provided a means to value options based on
their terms and factors affecting the market price and volatility of the underlying asset. Conse-
quently, even illiquid derivatives could be valued if there was a market for the underlying
asset. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,
81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 640–53 (1973) (explaining the principles and formula that permit the
pricing of options through reference to the value of an underlying asset). That pricing model
quickly gained hold among traders and risk managers, allowing instruments to be created and
valued even where there was no trading market for the derivative itself. See PETER L. BERN-
STEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL STREET 227 (1992) (dis-
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and expanded the scope of risks that could be transferred through the capital
markets.98 Exchange-traded currency and oil price derivatives, for example,
overtook less liquid and more costly private instruments that had been popu-
lar just a few years earlier.99 Greater liquidity in the risk markets, and the
introduction of new risk management technologies,100 also permitted the cre-
ation of a growing array of private, over-the-counter hedging solutions that
were closely tailored to a firm’s specific risks.101
Of course, in a frictionless world, if a firm chooses to transfer risk, we
would expect the premium it pays to mirror the risk-related costs the firm
would otherwise incur in raising capital—a zero-sum game, since the risk
would now be borne by the transferee’s shareholders, who should demand
cussing the popularity of the Black-Scholes model among traders); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Derivative Securities and Corporate Governance, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 734–35 (2002)
(describing the effect of the Black-Scholes model on the derivatives market).
97 See Myron S. Scholes, Global Financial Markets, Derivative Securities, and Systemic
Risks, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 271, 272 (1996) (noting that frictions limit an innovation’s
adoption and so successful financial innovations must provide financial services at lower cost).
For example, financial intermediaries in the early 1980s typically earned an up-front fee for
arranging a plain vanilla swap, plus a spread as high as fifty basis points over the life of the
transaction. Less than ten years later, reflecting new entrants and increased competition in the
swaps marketplace, the up-front fee was dropped and spreads were reduced to five to ten basis
points. See Robert T. Daigler & Donald Steelman, Interest Rate Swaps and Financial Institu-
tions 8–9 (Nov. 1988) (unpublished working paper, on file with author), available at http://
www.fiu.edu/~daiglerr/pdf/swaps.pdf.
98 See CHRISTOPHER L. CULP, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND INSURANCE 22 (2006); Allen &
Gale, supra note 74, at 38–39 (demonstrating why increased liquidity encourages a bank to R
more effectively manage the different risks it must bear which, in turn, improves its overall
level of risk-sharing).
99 The Chicago Mercantile Exchange, for example, provided a liquid and standardized
alternative to the over-the-counter (OTC) market for foreign exchange derivatives. See ERIK
BANKS, EXCHANGE-TRADED DERIVATIVES 129 (2003); CHARLES W. SMITHSON, MANAGING FI-
NANCIAL RISK 18–19 (3d ed. 1998) (noting that the introduction of futures contracts on the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange opened the forward foreign exchange market to new types of
investors). The Chicago Board Options Exchange did the same for options trading. See ROB-
ERT C. MERTON, CONTINUOUS-TIME FINANCE 330 (1990) (explaining that the Chicago Board
Options Exchange initially permitted trading in call options for twelve companies but later
expanded to include both calls and puts on hundreds of stocks). Firms also began to hedge by
issuing hybrid instruments that combined traditional debt or equity with foreign exchange,
interest rate, and commodity hedging instruments. For example, Mexico’s state-owned petro-
leum company, PEMEX, issued petroleum-linked bonds in 1973. In the mid-1980s, firms be-
gan issuing dual currency bonds, bonds with embedded foreign exchange options, convertible/
exchangeable floating-rate notes, and inverse floating-rate notes. Other firms issued securities
whose returns were tied to natural gas, petroleum, and other commodity prices. See SMITHSON,
supra, at 18–23, 320–30.
100 See Dan Rosen, The Development of Risk Management Software, in MODERN RISK
MANAGEMENT: A HISTORY 135, 136–37 (Sarah Jenkins & Tamsin Kennedy eds., 2003) (noting
that the spread of third-party risk management software in the mid 1980s was preceded by
hardware that permitted derivatives traders to quickly apply the Black-Scholes model to price
their trades).
101 In general, OTC derivatives become less costly as public risk transfer markets develop
that allow financial intermediaries to diversify away their risks across a broader array of
counterparties. See Myron S. Scholes, The Future of Futures, in RISK MANAGEMENT
PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS 349, 365 (William H. Beaver & George Parker eds., 1995) (explain-
ing that the cost of derivatives and other instruments decreased as their increasing importance
in risk management strategies resulted in investors being able to more properly price them).
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the same returns as the transferor’s shareholders. If the risk counterparty,
however, is better able to manage risk at lower cost, then, over time, the
premium ought to fall below the cost the transferor would otherwise bear if
the risk was retained.102 The implications are significant: as markets have
continued to develop, risk transfer instruments—like CDS, in the case of
credit risk—have become a lower cost substitute for the in-house manage-
ment of the same risk. The result, as described in the next Part, is the ability
of traditional intermediaries to transfer risk-bearing to new, lower-cost mar-
ket participants through the capital markets. In effect, new instruments have
enabled banks to outsource a core function from an industry subject to close,
prudential supervision to new non-bank financial firms, in many cases sub-
ject to lower levels of regulation.103
IV. OUTSOURCING RISK MANAGEMENT
Most corporate debt is private, and most private lenders are banks (al-
though increasingly they include non-banks).104 Even among public firms,
which can access large pools of capital, roughly eighty percent maintain pri-
102 See Prakash Shimpi, Integrating Risk Management and Capital Management, J. AP-
PLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2002, at 27, 29–37 (describing standard corporate finance and insur-
ance models of capital structure).
103 Regulators have long known that traditional intermediaries transfer risk among each
other and have encouraged it based on the relative cost of capital. See THE JOINT FORUM, RISK
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND REGULATORY CAPITAL: CROSS-SECTORAL COMPARISON 46–57
(2001), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint04.pdf (outlining the major differences be-
tween jurisdictions, including differences in accounting rules, capital requirements, and defini-
tions of capital, that influence intermediaries to transfer risk to other jurisdictions) [hereinafter
JOINT FORUM, RISK MANAGEMENT]; Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of
Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227–35 (1997) (describing the use of derivatives to
arbitrage financial regulation). Properly structured, capital requirements provided an incentive
for intermediaries to transfer risk to lower cost participants in order to optimize risk allocation.
See Gu¨nter Franke & Jan Pieter Krahnen, Default Risk Sharing between Banks and Markets:
The Contribution of Collateralized Debt Obligations, in THE RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS 603, 629 (Mark Steven Carey & Rene´ M. Stulz eds., 2007) (exploring the effect that
CDO transactions have on the risk profiles of originating banks) [hereinafter RISKS OF FINAN-
CIAL INSTITUTIONS] ; Wolf Wagner & Ian W. Marsh, Credit Risk Transfer and Financial Sector
Stability, 2 J. FIN. STABILITY 173, 174–75 (2006) (noting that, although credit risk transfer
helps firms diversify away risk, such transfers may also destabilize institutions participating in
the credit risk transfer markets). Banks, for example, are subject to high capital costs and so, in
order to minimize them, have transferred risky assets to non-bank intermediaries (in many
cases, insurance companies) that are less susceptible to financial shocks and, therefore, subject
to lower costs. See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Systemic Risk and Regulation, in RISKS OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, supra, at 341, 346 (modeling credit risk transfers in complete mar-
kets and finding that such transfers can promote efficient risk-sharing and increase overall
welfare if properly structured).
104 See Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 447, 458 (1999); Joel Houston & Christopher James, Bank Information Monopolies
and the Mix of Private and Public Debt Claims, 51 J. FIN. 1863, 1870–79 (1996) (tracking the
debt structure of 250 publicly traded firms between 1980 and 1990); Marcel Kahan & Bruce
Tuckman, Private vs. Public Lending: Evidence from Covenants 11–13 (Anderson Grad. Sch.
Mgmt., Paper No. 13-93, 1993) (finding that private debt agreements control management
actions more than public debt).
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vate credit arrangements.105 Within the traditional framing, lenders tend to
rely on covenants to manage a borrower’s credit risk. Covenants act as early
warning “trip wires,”106 permitting lenders to reassess borrowers and miti-
gate loss by renegotiating loans upon (or prior to) default.107 To be effective,
however, covenants must be monitored and enforced.108 Lenders can rely on
pre-existing relationships to do so inexpensively.109 Delegating authority to
an intermediary, such as a bank, can further lower costs to the extent the
bank is better able to monitor and respond to change in a borrower’s circum-
stances.110 Key to such delegation is the bank’s ability to obtain quasi-public
information about borrowers at lower cost than others.111 Banks rely on mon-
itoring and long-term relationships to develop that information, without the
cost of duplication across multiple lenders.112
Historically, that informational advantage limited the banks’ ability to
resell loans, which partly explains why a liquid private credit market failed
to develop before change in the lending business in the 1980s.113 Less
knowledgeable purchasers were likely to discount a loan’s value, or attempt
to engage in their own costly monitoring of a borrower, resulting in a drop in
the price at which the loan could be sold.114 Consequently, banks were better
105 See Greg Nini et al., Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy, 92 J. FIN.
ECON. 400, 401 (2009) (noting, as well, that roughly only fifteen to twenty percent of public
firms have outstanding public debt).
106 George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate
Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1093–94 (1995) (suggesting that the voidable preference
in bankruptcy law encourages lenders to closely monitor borrowers through the use of
covenants).
107 Oliver Hart & John Moore, Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt, 63
Q. J. ECON. 1, 2 (1998) (describing the role of renegotiation in a lender-borrower relationship).
108 See Nicolae Gaˆrleanu & Jeffrey Zwiebel, Design and Renegotiation of Debt Cove-
nants, 22 REV. FIN. STUDIES 749, 750–53 (2009) (noting that initial covenants are purposefully
designed to be overly strict, which permits the lender to control or influence the actions of the
borrower); Kahan & Tuckman, supra note 104, at 6–7. R
109 Kahan & Tuckman, supra note 104, at 7, 25–26 (noting that, because private debt R
issues are usually held by a small, sophisticated group of investors, agency costs can be
minimized).
110 See Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51
REV. ECON. STUD. 393, 393–95 (1984) (developing a model in which a financial intermediary
has a net cost advantage relative to direct lending); Fama, supra note 83, at 36–38. R
111 Fischer Black, Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 323,
323–24 (1975) (noting that the inefficiency of banking markets permits banks to profitably
exploit quasi-public information); Fama, supra note 83, at 35–39 (explaining how other market R
participants, cognizant of the banks’ informational advantage, react to bank action); Triantis &
Daniels, supra note 106, at 1083–90 (attributing the monitoring advantage enjoyed by banks to R
special characteristics of the banking sector, including the banks’ ability to cross-benchmark
different borrowers and press borrowers for more information).
112 Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1212–13, 1219–23 (2006) (describing the
role of banks and covenants in the corporate decision-making of firms in financial distress);
Diamond, supra note 110, at 393–95. R
113 Those changes are described infra notes 118–35 and accompanying text. R
114 Diamond, supra note 110, at 410. The asymmetry resulted in the classic “lemons prob- R
lem” described in George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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off if they assessed credit risk and borrower concentrations at the time the
loan was made115 and then held that loan to its maturity.116 The inability to
transfer loans, in turn, reinforced the value to lenders of covenants and
monitoring.117
The business of banking, and the role of banks as intermediaries, began
to change in the 1970s and 1980s, driven by increasing bank and non-bank
competition,118 product and other innovation in the marketplace,119 and
changes in financial regulation.120 New capital requirements, introduced in
the late 1980s, were intended to provide banks with a cushion against the
risk of loan loss, the possibility of a bank run, and, in light of the banks’
systemic importance, the resulting harm to the real economy.121 The new
115 See JOHN B. CAOUETTE ET AL., MANAGING CREDIT RISK: THE NEXT GREAT FINANCIAL
CHALLENGE 65 (1998) (noting that banks traditionally evaluated only the risk associated with
individual loans and were not concerned with selling loans to diversify their exposure at the
portfolio level); Edward I. Altman, Corporate Bond and Commercial Loan Portfolio Analysis
1 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 96–41, 1996) (noting that banks, apart from
measuring the credit risk related to individual loans, recognize the value of properly measuring
credit concentration risks); Paul Glasserman, Probability Models of Credit Risk 1 (2000),
available at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pglasserman/B6014/Prob_Credit.pdf (not-
ing that increasing complexity in measuring credit risk has encouraged banks to measure credit
risk at the portfolio level).
116 See Amihud et al., supra note 104, at 466; Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in R
Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 56 (1982) (noting that banks have an
incentive to monitor borrowers, irrespective of free riding by other creditors); Gary Gorton &
George Pennacchi, Banks and Loan Sales: Marketing Non-marketable Assets 1–3, 29 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3551, 1990) (examining the opening of loan
sales markets during 1980s).
117 See Black, supra note 111, at 329–30; Philip E. Strahan, Borrower Risk and the Price R
and Nonprice Terms of Bank Loans FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES,
STAFF REPORT NO. 90, 2–8 (1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=192769 (finding that
banks adjust price and non-price terms to facilitate monitoring and limit loan losses).
118 See LOWELL L. BRYAN, BREAKING UP THE BANK: RETHINKING AN INDUSTRY UNDER
SIEGE 22–28 (1988) (noting that banks, in an effort to compensate for losses caused by the
expansion of MMFs, adopted a variety of different tactics, including shedding unproductive
divisions and expanding into new product areas); KERRY COOPER & DONALD R. FRASER,
BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW COMPETITION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 2–17
(1984) (outlining the commercial banks’ decline in market share and the convergence in finan-
cial services that blurred the traditional distinction between depository and non-depository
financial institutions); Franklin Allen & Anthony M. Santomero, What Do Financial In-
termediaries Do?, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 271, 276–82 (2001) (explaining how the rise of
nonbank financial institutions and new financial products cut into the traditional types of ser-
vices offered by banks).
119 See Allen N. Berger et al., The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a
Long, Strange Trip It’s Been, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 1995, Issue 2, at 55,
68–70 (describing key product innovations, including swaps and certain types of futures, that
permitted banks to enter into new lines of business).
120 See COOPER & FRASER, supra note 118, at 195–217; ROBERT E. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD R
BANKS DO? 33–59 (1987); Berger et al., supra note 119, at 127 (attributing the dramatic R
change in the banking industry during the 1970s and 1980s to the “extraordinary number of
major regulatory changes that occurred during this period”); see also Richardson et al., supra
note 10, at 182. R
121 See JOINT FORUM, RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 103, at 10–11, 31, 34–38 (identify- R
ing the key elements informing the supervisory efforts made by regulators over banks); Frank-
lin Allen & Richard Herring, Banking Regulation versus Securities Market Regulation 4–7
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requirements, however, also made it more expensive for banks to continue
the lending business as they had before.122 In addition, competing products
(such as MMFs) offered attractive alternatives to bank deposits, so that
banks could no longer count on depositors to cushion against loan losses.123
Banks therefore began to consider new businesses such as trading for their
own account and selling new products and services. These new lines of busi-
ness were not only more profitable than lending but were also not subject to
the same levels of credit risk.124 In addition, banks began to reassess the
lending business—with many turning to a defensive, portfolio-based strat-
egy in order to minimize overall credit costs.125
New technologies also helped banks optimize their loan portfolios.126
Banks could more actively buy and sell loans and other credit instruments in
(Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 01–29, 2001), available at http://knowledge.whar-
ton.upenn.edu/papers/1174.pdf (noting that the focus of banking regulation, in light of the
harm caused by the Great Depression, is to avoid financial crises through the elimination or
control of systemic risk); Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, Financial Regulation in a Sys-
tem Context, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2008, at 229, 230, 234–35 (explain-
ing the mechanics of a bank run and demonstrating that actions taken by firms to shore-up
their own positions to avoid runs may weaken financial market stability).
122 See Charles K. Whitehead, What’s Your Sign?—International Norms, Signals, and
Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 695, 721–25 (2006) (describing implementation of the Basel
Accord on bank regulatory capital); Charles Smithson et al., Results from the 2002 Survey of
Credit Portfolio Management Practices 5 (2002) (noting that regulatory capital was a primary
motivation to transfer loans), available at http://www.isdadocs.org/c_and_a/pdf/2002-cpm-
survey.pdf.
123 Robert DeYoung & William C. Hunter, Deregulation, the Internet, and the Competitive
Viability of Large Banks and Community Banks, in THE FUTURE OF BANKING 173, 178–79
(Benton E. Gup ed., 2003) (describing the effect of information technology innovation on the
financial markets); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
215, 239–42 (2002) (describing the structure and evolution of MMFs, their comparative ad-
vantages over traditional bank deposits, and congressional attempts to put banks on an equal
competitive footing with MMFs); see also supra notes 82–88 and accompanying text. R
124 Allen & Santomero, supra note 118, at 279–81 (noting that banks now derive more R
than half their income from fee-producing and trading activities, whereas they had traditionally
relied on interest rate spreads for roughly eighty percent of their income).
125 See Allen & Gale, supra note 83, at 538–41; Berger et al., supra note 119, at 68–69, R
80–83; Allen & Santomero, supra note 118, at 288, 290–91. Actively managing portfolio risk R
was, at the time, principally limited to equities, with credit risk instead being transferred
through traditional (and more costly) instruments like financial guarantees and credit insur-
ance. A liquid market to buy and sell credit risk, as well as the creation of a measure of default
risk and correlation across loans, was necessary in order for portfolio risk management to be
extended to debt. See CAOUETTE ET AL., supra note 115, at 231–42, 267–72; Paul Bennett, R
Applying Portfolio Theory to Global Bank Lending, 8 J. BANKING & FIN. 153, 156–57 (1984)
(noting that the measurement of covariances across different borrowers is key for efficient
portfolio construction).
126 By 2002, a credit portfolio model developed by quantitative risk management firm
KMV, LLC (KMV) had become the most widely used in the banking industry. See 2000 Hall
of Fame, DERIVATIVESSTRATEGY.COM (Mar. 2000), http://www.derivativesstrategy.com/maga
zine/archive/2000/0300fea1.asp (explaining that KMV provides default probabilities, with
windows ranging from one to five years, for over 20,000 companies around the world). The
KMV model is described in Stephen Kealhofer & Jeffrey R. Bohn, Portfolio Management of
Default Risk, KMV (May 2001), available at http://www.moodyskmv.com/research/
whitepaper/Portfolio_Management_of_Default_Risk.pdf. Other methods have also been devel-
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order to better manage their credit exposure.127 Banks also became less inter-
ested in holding loans to maturity in light of the ability to enhance returns by
selling loan interests to others.128 The result was a shift in the lending busi-
ness.129 Syndicated loans and secondary loan trading,130 spurred by the lever-
aged buyout wave that began in the mid-1980s,131 grew both in aggregate
size132 and total number of investors.133 The new liquidity enabled banks to
oped to measure a loan portfolio’s risk and return characteristics. See CAOUETTE ET AL., supra
note 115, at 285–99. R
127 See GLANTZ, supra note 27, at 423–49; CAOUETTE ET AL., supra note 115, at 4; Ben- R
nett, supra note 125, at 156–59 (noting that, for modern portfolio theory to be effective, banks R
must be able to measure the riskiness of the individual assets comprising a particular
portfolio).
128 See JAMES L. PIERCE, THE FUTURE OF BANKING 83 (1991) (noting that banks, by lever-
aging expertise, technological efficiencies, and informational advantages, have been able to
offer additional financial services that compete with mutual funds); David T. Llewellyn, Bank-
ing in the 21st Century: The Transformation of an Industry, in THE FUTURE OF THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM 141, 164, 169 (Malcom Edey ed., 1996) (describing pressures on banking due to
structural and operational change); Allen & Santomero, supra note 118, at 280–82. R
129 See CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS, U.S. BANK DEREGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
341 (2000) (noting that banks, in response to changes in business model, began to concentrate
less on the profitability of particular retail transactions or product lines and more on expanding
client relationships); Llewellyn, supra note 128, at 169–70; Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas, R
Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt: Capital Structure and Financial Market Equilibrium Under
Asymmetric Information, 108 J. POL. ECON. 324, 326–27 (2000) (describing the banks’ motiva-
tion to securitize loans); Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 in Transition – From Boom to Bust and
Into the Future, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 379 (2007) (describing a shift in bank holdings,
comprising over seventy percent of loans in 1995 to below thirteen percent by 2007).
130 In a syndicated loan, one or more “lead banks” negotiate the terms of the loan with the
borrower and sell portions to others at the time of origination. See Glenn Yago & Donald
McCarthy, The U.S. Leveraged Loan Market: A Primer, MILKEN INST. 14–22 (Oct. 2004),
http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/loan_primer_1004.pdf (providing a general history of the
syndicated loan market). Interests in a loan, whether or not it is syndicated, can also be sold in
the secondary market, although secondary trading is dominated by loans to riskier borrowers
and non-bank investors. See William H. Widen, Lord of the Liens: Towards Greater Efficiency
in Secured Syndicated Lending, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577, 1585–90 (2004) (explaining how
growth of the syndicated loan market led to the creation of new syndicated loan structures);
Yago & McCarthy, supra, at 23–28, 35–37 (documenting the growth in the transference of
loans from the primary to the secondary market and in the trading of syndicated loans from the
1980s to 2000s); Steven Drucker & Manju Puri, On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lend-
ing Relationships 1 (FDIC Ctr. for Research, Working Paper No. WP 2007–04, Mar. 2007)
(noting that U.S. banks in 2005 raised over $1.5 trillion through the use of loan syndications).
Bank lenders, therefore, can transfer loans at the time of origination, as well as sell all or part
of a loan at a later date. A description of the syndicated loan market, and how it differs from
the secondary trading market, can be found in Amir Sufi, Information Asymmetry and Financ-
ing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans, 62 J. FIN. 629, 632–34 (2007) (contend-
ing that the principal differences between the syndicated loan market and the secondary
trading market relate to the nature of the relationship between the parties and the quality of the
underlying loans).
131 A description of the growth of the leveraged loan market appears in Robert P. Bartlett
III, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts Bidding Outcomes in Corporate
Takeovers, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975, 2011–20 (2008) (noting that the need for banks to help
their customers finance leveraged buyouts during the mid-1980s led to an explosion in the
syndicated loan market).
132 The market for syndicated loans grew from $137 million in 1987 to over $1 trillion in
2007. Sufi, supra note 130, at 629. Loan trading also grew, from $8 billion in 1991 to $176.3 R
billion in 2005. See Drucker & Puri, supra note 130, at 1. R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\hlb\1-1\HLB107.txt unknown Seq: 25 22-JUN-11 15:37
2011] The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets 63
minimize credit costs by diversifying their exposure across a range of bor-
rowers.134 Likewise, banks that participated in the loan market could hold
less capital against riskier loans, which, in turn, produced more profitable
loan portfolios.135
Investing in a loan, however, requires the buyer to invest working capi-
tal. Consequently, a credit derivatives market also developed,136 partly to
permit lenders to transfer credit risk without requiring the buyer to make a
working capital commitment.137 The result was to open up the private credit
market to new participants—particularly hedge funds.138 At the same time,
133 Investors now include pension funds, hedge funds, insurance companies, specialty fi-
nance companies, and foreign institutions. See Joseph G. Haubrich & James B. Thomson, The
Evolving Loan Sales Market, ECON. COMMENTARY, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND 3
(July 15, 1993), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/1993/0715.pdf.
134 Greater liquidity, for example, resulted in increased diversification among leveraged
loan investors. U.S. banks held only seven percent of the underwritten loans, compared with
thirty percent or more in the mid-1990s. Institutional investors, in turn, held seventy-five per-
cent of the loans, compared with only sixteen percent in 1995. See The Risk of Leveraged
Loans is Reportedly Growing, N.Y. TIMES.COM, June 12, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
06/12/business/worldbusiness/12iht-risks.1.6105944.html (quoting a Goldman Sachs Group
research report that found institutional investors to have replaced banks in certain types of
leveraged-loan deals); see also Serena Ng & Henry Sender, Easy Money: Beyond Buyout
Surge, A Debt Market Booms, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2007, at A1 (reporting that the increased
liquidity provided by collateralized loan obligations helped fuel a record number of corporate
buyouts).
135 See A. Sinan Cebenoyan & Philip E. Strahan, Risk Management, Capital Structure and
Lending at Banks, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 19, 38 (2004) (attributing the increased profitability
of banks participating in the secondary market to their ability to operate with less capital and
engage in risky lending, in each case through the purchase and sale of loans).
136 The global credit derivatives market was estimated to be $180 billion (notional
amount) in 1996. Ross Barrett & John Ewan, BBA Credit Derivatives Report 2006 5, BRITISH
BANKERS’ ASSOC. (2006), www.bba.org.uk/download/6158. By the end of 2007, an estimated
$45 trillion in notional amount of CDS were traded (up from $632 billion in 2001). David
Mengle, Credit Derivatives: An Overview, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA: ECON. REV. 7
(4th Quarter, 2007), www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/erq407_mengle.pdf; see also Gretchen
Morgenson, First Comes the Swap. Then It’s the Knives., N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008, at BU1
(reporting that, in 2008, the nominal value of outstanding CDS stood at $62 trillion compared
to $900 billion in 2000). A description of credit derivative instruments appears in GLANTZ,
supra note 27, at 531–49; Masters & Bryson, supra note 27, at 43–85. R
137 See CAOUETTE ET AL., supra note 115, at 311–12; GLANTZ, supra note 27, at 532; R
Angus Duncan, Loan-only Credit Default Swaps: The March to Liquidity, COM. LENDING
REV., Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 19, 20 (noting that CDS, because they are functionally a hedge
against default, can be used by banks to limit or reduce capital requirements); Bernadette
Minton et al., How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to Reduce Risk? 35 J. FIN. SER-
VICES RESEARCH 1, 7 (2009) (finding that the banks most likely to employ credit risk protec-
tion were large banks controlling a high concentration of overall bank assets); see also Hamish
Risk, Loan Credit-Default Swaps Surge as Hedge Funds Hunger for Yield, BLOOMBERG (Aug.
22, 2006) http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a4fg_8Gw37Fw&re
fer=home (noting that “[w]hen investors can’t get the loans, they’re increasingly using credit-
default swaps”).
138 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-716, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: CON-
FIRMATION BACKLOGS INCREASED DEALERS’ OPERATIONAL RISKS, BUT WERE SUCCESSFULLY
ADDRESSED AFTER JOINT REGULATORY ACTION 6 n.8 (2007) (citing a British Bankers’ Associa-
tion report that the “top five end-users of credit derivatives are banks and broker-dealers
(forty-four percent), hedge funds (thirty-two percent), insurers (seventeen percent), pension
funds (four percent), and mutual funds (three percent)”); Risk, supra note 137; Daniel Fisher, R
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using CDS, a bank could buy and sell all or a portion of a borrower’s credit
risk—managing its credit exposure,139 diversifying its portfolio,140 and mini-
mizing regulatory capital,141 while also maintaining the client relationship.142
Since the credit derivatives market is largely private, it is unclear how often
lenders use derivatives to hedge credit risk. Total volumes, however, contin-
ued to grow through 2008, with indications that their use to diversify credit
risk is becoming more common.143 Moreover, Bank of America estimated
that, in 2006, approximately thirteen percent of the CDS market—equal to
$3.2 trillion in notional amount—involved the net transfer of credit risk
away from banks’ loan portfolios.144 For banks, the benefits have been sub-
stantial145—enabling them to manage and diversify credit risk at lower cost
A Dangerous Game, FORBES, Oct. 16, 2006, at 40 (citing a Greenwich Associates analysis that
fifty-eight percent of CDS are traded by hedge funds); Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps:
The Next Crisis?, TIME, Mar. 17, 2008 (noting that an original CDS can be traded fifteen or
twenty times).
139 See Mengle, supra note 136, at 15–17 (describing the hedging mechanics of CDS and R
the development of more sophisticated and flexible hedging strategies); Minton et al., supra
note 137, at 3–4, 10–11 (explaining that banks that focus on extending loans to commercial R
and industrial borrowers are more likely to purchase credit risk protection to hedge against
borrower default).
140 CAOUETTE ET AL., supra note 115, at 311–12; GLANTZ, supra note 27, at 532; Minton R
et al., supra note 137, at 25. R
141 See Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default
Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 175
(2007) (describing the function and use of CDS); Duncan, supra note 137, at 19–20 (explain- R
ing the recent development of the loan-only CDS and how it differs from a standard CDS). The
market also grew as a result of trading, unrelated to hedging, by banks and other institutions
for their own accounts and for clients. See Darrell Duffie, Innovations in Credit Risk Transfer:
Implications for Financial Stability 4–5 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 255,
July 2008) (noting that, from 2001 through 2006, the majority of CDS executed by banks were
on behalf of clients who used CDS as a form of investment).
142 The importance to a client relationship of holding a loan, even if the credit risk is
transferred, was illustrated in the WorldCom securities litigation. There, J.P. Morgan sought to
decrease its exposure to WorldCom by entering into CDS without WorldCom becoming aware
it had transferred the risk. See In Re WorldCom, Inc. Secs. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 651–52
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
143 See Viral V. Acharya & Timothy C. Johnson, Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives, 84
J. FIN. ECON. 110, 111 (2007) (suggesting that credit derivatives have been “the most signifi-
cant and successful financial innovation of the last decade,” permitting banks and other finan-
cial institutions to withstand high levels of corporate default during 2000–2004); Frank
Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1019, 1034 (2007) (discussing the growth in size and scope of the CDS market, particu-
larly for many of the largest corporations); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity, and
Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 663,
682–83 (2008) (noting that the growth of the CDS market has caused conflicts for certain
creditors who also hold CDS against their borrowers, as it may be more profitable for them if
the borrower defaults); Duffie, supra note 141, at 4–5 (noting that, by 2006, the CDS market R
had an outstanding notional amount of $25 trillion); Debtwire, North American Distressed
Debt Market Outlook 2008 15 (2008), http://www.debtwire.com/library.marketview?DocID=
1083 (finding, in a poll of 101 different hedge fund managers, proprietary trading desks, and
other asset managers, that CDS use was the most prevalent hedging strategy).
144 See Duffie, supra note 141, at 4–5. R
145 Those benefits are described in more detail in Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell,
Securitization, Risk, and the Liquidity Problem, in STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN BANKING 227,
238–46 (Michael Klausner & Lawrence J. White eds., 1993) (surveying theories that relate to
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than before.146 Borrowers have benefited as well. A portion of the gains can
be passed on, for example, through increased lending limits or lower interest
rates, resulting in an overall decline in a borrower’s real cost of capital.147
The result is that banks can now rely on new instruments, such as CDS,
to diversify and transfer credit risk.148 New market entrants can invest in the
credit risk of a bank’s loan portfolio without extending loans themselves and,
having transferred the credit risk, the originator no longer has a direct inter-
est in monitoring the borrowers or managing the transferred exposure. In
effect, with CDS, banks can now outsource the management of credit risk to
someone else. The Bank of America data indicate that, after banks and se-
curities firms, hedge funds are the second largest group of participants in the
CDS market.149 Thus, by investing in CDS, hedge funds can assume a core
function of intermediation—the management of credit risk—but without the
regulation or informational access that characterized such management by
banks in the past.150
Banks and hedge funds, therefore, are somewhat tied at the hip. Banks
can transfer credit risk, and hedge funds can assist in managing it.151 Disloca-
the benefits of securitization and the reasons why lenders securitize loans); George Pennacchi,
Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital, 43 J. FIN. 375, 375–76 (1988) (noting that some of
the benefits afforded by loan sales or securitizations include lower cost financing and im-
proved risk management).
146 See Katerina Simons, Why Do Banks Syndicate Loans?, NEW ENGLAND ECON. REV.,
Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 45, 45–47 (noting that loan syndications, and other forms of secondary
intermediation, permit banks to reduce exposure to individual borrowers and reduce unwanted
risk concentrations); Rebecca S. Demsetz, Bank Loan Sales: A New Look at the Motivations
for Secondary Market Activity 22–23, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES,
STAFF REPORT NO. 69 (Mar. 1999), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/
staff_reports/sr69.pdf (noting that loan syndications and other credit risk transfers permit
banks to diversify their holdings which, in turn, allows banks to realize benefits—including
increased profitability—not available to less diversified banks).
147 See A. Burak Gu¨ner, Loan Sales and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing, 19 REV. FIN.
STUD. 687, 713 (2006) (finding that corporate loans that are originated for sale have lower
yields than traditional corporate loans because loans intended for sale have a lower cost of
funding for banks than traditional loans); Pennacchi, supra note 145, at 375–76 (suggesting R
that the reduced finance and capital costs that banks can realize through loan sales permit them
to lend to a greater number of borrowers, including riskier borrowers).
148 See Duffie, supra note 141, at 5; see also Benedikt Goderis et al., Bank Behaviour with R
Access to Credit Risk Transfer Markets 9 n.1 (Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers,
Paper No. 4/2007) (2007), available at http://www.bof.fi/NR/rdonlyres/801B7C28-819B-
4A72-877A-0926F00563D1/0/0704netti.pdf (noting that European banks are much more ac-
tive than their U.S. counterparts in use of the CDS markets).
149 See Duffie, supra note 141, at 5; see also supra note 138 and accompanying text. R
150 Hedge funds, like banks, can manage that risk through diversification, see supra notes
134, 140 and accompanying text, but may also choose to speculate on whether a referenced R
entity’s credit quality will improve or decline. A discussion of the risks of speculation and the
systemic issues surrounding credit derivatives is included in Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 143, R
at 1032–50.
151 Bank-hedge fund relationships may become increasingly concentrated as hedge funds
continue to restructure and consolidate. See Matteo Tonello & Stephen Rabimov, The 2010
Institutional Investment Report 49–50 (The Conference Board, Research Report R-1468-10-
RR), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1707512&download=
yes (describing the losses—and resulting consolidation—in the hedge fund industry following
the financial crisis) .
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tion in one industry is likely to create problems in the other,152 with aggre-
gate bank returns to date appearing to have had a more significant impact on
hedge funds than vice versa.153 Part of the effect may have been due to banks
(prior to the Volcker Rule) engaging in proprietary trading that competed
with hedge funds.154 Another part may have resulted from banks providing
fee-based services to hedge funds that declined when the hedge fund indus-
try slowed.155 This Article illustrates a third linkage between the two—
through the ability of banks to transfer credit risk to hedge fund managers,
which can then trade and diversify that risk among other market participants.
Doing so has enabled banks to pursue a traditional banking function—
namely, the extension of loans—at lower cost.156 Yet, as a result of its reli-
ance on CDS, a downturn in the hedge fund industry may affect a bank’s
ability to extend new loans, resulting in a decline in available credit or an
increase in the cost of capital. Stated differently, even though a principal
goal of the Volcker Rule is to return banks to traditional banking,157 the in-
creased risk-taking resulting from the transfer of proprietary trading to hedge
funds may still affect a bank’s ability to extend credit.
There is, in fact, a real risk of an industry-wide slowdown among hedge
funds. Recent evidence suggests that, under some circumstances, hedge
funds may perform in the same way, irrespective of management style, caus-
ing an overall decline in hedge fund performance at the same time. Specifi-
cally, if there is a reduction in funding—for example, due to creditor
concerns over the value of assets that hedge funds post as collateral158—
managers may be forced to reduce leverage and, in turn, trade fewer assets,
resulting in a decline in liquidity. That decline can cause funding to drop
even further, creating a downward spiral across the industry that affects most
managers in the same way.159 Greater coordination among hedge funds can,
152 See Nicholas Chan et al., Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds, in RISKS OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 103, at 235, 318, 326. R
153 See Monica Billio et al., Econometric Measures of Systemic Risk in the Finance and
Insurance Sectors 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16223, July 2010),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16223 (noting that financial innovation, like securi-
tization, and the emergence of new business relationships between banks and hedge funds have
resulted in a closer interrelationship between them).
154 See Chan et al., supra note 152, at 90; Billio et al., supra note 153, at 3. R
155 See Chan et al., supra note 152, at 90. R
156 See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text. R
157 See supra notes 12–17 and accompanying text. R
158 See Tomas Garbaravicius & Frank Dierick, Hedge Funds and Their Implications for
Financial Stability 43–45 (Eur. Cent. Bank Occasional Paper Series, Paper No. 34, Aug. 2005),
available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp34.pdf (noting that hedge funds, due to
their high levels of leverage, can quickly suffer significant losses and the lack of liquidity
buffers often results in their being forced to liquidate positions, further increasing market
volatility).
159 See Boyson et al., supra note 25, at 1814–15. R
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in turn, amplify any downturn in performance, as traders jointly react to the
decline in asset prices.160
Financial regulation helps police the amount of risk that a bank can
incur, as well as how that risk is managed. When outsourced to a less-regu-
lated entity, however, the bank must rely on its own protections to ensure
proper management. Doing so may be difficult. Chief among the concerns is
the risk of opportunism—the possibility that the vendor will shirk on prod-
ucts or services it provides once the outsourcing relationship has been fixed.
Firms typically protect themselves through contractual devices that align the
vendor’s interests with their own or preserve their right of exit, as well as
through close monitoring.161 Unlike most outsourcing, however, the bank
may not know who is ultimately performing the outsourced function—in
this case, managing the transferred risk. In fact, due to the sale and resale of
CDS, the risk is most likely shared among a group of investors, making
individual monitoring largely unfeasible.162
To be sure, the Dodd-Frank Act expanded hedge fund regulation by,
among other things, eliminating the private adviser exemption from the In-
vestment Advisers Act of 1940 and, with certain exceptions, requiring pri-
vate fund advisers to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).163 As a practical matter, however, the new requirements are likely to
do little to affect the hedge fund industry, since many of the largest advisers
were already SEC-registered.164 Moreover, based on current resources, the
160 See Whitehead, supra note 26 at 346–51; see also Jenny Strasburg & Susan Pulliam, R
Hedge Funds’ Pack Behavior Magnifies Swings in Market Funds, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2011,
at A1 (noting the increased tendency of hedge funds to adopt similar trading strategies, ampli-
fying market swings).
161 See George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 955, 982–1002 (2007) (analyzing techniques to control agency costs in
outsourcing).
162 For example, at the time of its bankruptcy, there were approximately $72 billion in
notional amount of CDS tied to Lehman Brothers, with estimates of up to $400 billion in total
notional amount linked to it. On a net basis, however, only $5.2 billion was ultimately paid
out. Part of the difference reflected trading among market participants, with offsetting trades
shrinking the amount of actual risk that was covered by outstanding swaps. See Gordon Platt,
Credit Default Swaps Market Outstandings Shrink as Dealers Tear Up Offsetting Agreements,
GLOBAL FIN., Dec. 2008, at 68, 70.
163 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111–203, § 403, 24 Stat. 1376 (2010) (Dodd-Frank Act); see also Exemptions for Advisers to
Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers With Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under
Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-3111
(Nov. 19, 2010), 75 Fed. Reg. 77,190 (Dec. 10, 2010); Rules Implementing Amendments to the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-3110 (Nov. 19,
2010), 75 Fed. Reg. 77,052 (Dec. 10, 2010).
164 About seventy percent of hedge fund assets were managed by advisers that had volun-
tarily registered with the SEC. See After Dodging Many Bullets, Hedge Funds Are Back in
Regulators’ Sights, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Mar. 18, 2009) http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.
edu/article.cfm?articleid=2185 (noting that many hedge funds were willing to voluntarily reg-
ister with the SEC in order to attract institutional investor funds).
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SEC estimates it will not be able to audit a registered investment adviser
more than once every eleven years.165
The Act also does little to directly address the outsourcing of a tradi-
tional bank function. Information the SEC gathers can be provided to the
FSOC in order to assist efforts to assess systemic risk.166 The principal regu-
lator, however, remains the SEC, with a rules-based (rather than prudential)
approach to overseeing the industry.167 The FSOC, with a vote of seven of its
ten members, can impose additional Federal Reserve regulation on systemi-
cally important non-bank financial firms.168 Although hedge fund advisers
can qualify,169 the principal focus appears to be on individual firms that are
“too big” or “too interconnected” to fail—a group that may include hedge
fund advisers, but is less likely to reflect the industry-to-industry relationship
between hedge funds and banks described in this Article.170
Nevertheless, the FSOC is also charged with identifying risks to U.S.
financial stability arising from activities in or outside the financial mar-
kets.171 As part of its mandate, the FSOC must “identify gaps in regulation
that could pose risks to” U.S. financial stability,172 as well as make recom-
mendations to primary regulators to “apply new or heightened standards and
safeguards for financial activities or practices that could create or increase
risks” among financial firms and markets.173 Both provisions authorize the
FSOC to assess the relationship between banks and hedge funds, including
the potential impact of the Volcker Rule on risk-taking by hedge funds and
the consequences for bank lending. As discussed in the next Part, that gen-
eral authority, as well as the FSOC Study, suggests an approach to imple-
menting the Volcker Rule that may help take account of changing financial
markets.
165 See SECS. EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT ADVISER EXAMINA-
TIONS 14 (Jan. 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/914studyfinal.pdf (study of ex-
amination and enforcement resources for investment advisers required by Dodd-Frank Act sec.
914).
166 Section 404 of the Dodd-Frank Act directs the SEC to require private fund advisers to
maintain records and file reports, including information necessary for the FSOC to assess
systemic risk. See Dodd-Frank Act § 404; see also Reporting by Investment Advisers to Pri-
vate Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on
Form PF, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-3145 (Jan. 26, 2011), 76 Fed. Reg. 8,068
(Feb. 11, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/ia-3145.pdf.
167 See Coffee & Sale, supra note 78, at 776–79 (noting that the SEC’s focus on rules- R
based regulation leaves it ill-suited to adapt to changes in the financial markets).
168 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. R
169 See 76 Fed. Reg. 7,731, supra note 5, at 7,734–35. R
170 See Rebecca Christie & Ian Katz, Hedge Funds May Pose Systemic Risk in Crisis, U.S.
Report Says, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 17, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-17/
hedge-funds-may-pose-systemic-risk-in-crisis-u-s-report-says.html (describing a confidential,
draft FSOC report that considers including certain hedge funds under Federal Reserve
oversight).
171 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 111, 112, (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321, 5322).
172 Id. § 112(a)(2)(G) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2)(G)).
173 Id. § 112(a)(2)(K) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2)(K)).
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V. IMPLEMENTING THE VOLCKER RULE
As the FSOC Study acknowledges, regulators who implement the
Volcker Rule have a narrow tightrope to walk.174 Among the issues to be
addressed, first, they must draw a line between permitted activities and pro-
prietary trading. Too narrow a definition of proprietary trading will undercut
the Volcker Rule, and too broad a definition may weaken the financial mar-
kets.175 Second, in implementing the Rule, regulators must account for dif-
ferences in assets and markets, as well as among banks and traders. The
FSOC Study, therefore, recommends a tailored approach to implementation,
relying on banks (subject to regulatory approval) to create their own compli-
ance programs and metrics. In order to minimize the risk of unfair advan-
tage, regulators must also be able to compare trading practices from firm to
firm and across different business units.176 And third, the FSOC Study rec-
ommends that regulation adapt over time to a fluid and changing market-
place. Innovation can result in strategies that circumvent the Volcker Rule,
but innovation can also be slowed, even when consistent with the Rule, if it
falls outside of whatever regulatory standards have been introduced.177
Part of the difficulty springs from the rise of new market participants
and new means to manage and transfer capital and risk. No doubt, some
portion of the shift away from traditional intermediaries has simply reflected
differences in regulation—a regulatory arbitrage, as new products and ser-
vices are created in order to minimize cost.178 Yet, arbitrage alone does not
fully explain the change. Many less-regulated firms are able to manage risk
more efficiently than traditional intermediaries. Hedge funds, for example,
minimize agency costs through a governance structure that helps them com-
pete effectively against others.179 Moreover, the capital markets permit effi-
cient risk-sharing among investors, who can transfer risks to entities that are
174 See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. R
175 See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. R
176 See supra notes 62, 67 and accompanying text. R
177 See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. R
178 See Partnoy, supra note 103, at 227–28. R
179 Hedge funds are typically organized as limited partnerships and may employ provi-
sions that restrict management discretion or otherwise grant investors specific rights, including
the regular distribution of free cash flow to a fund’s investors. Advisers also often invest their
own money in the funds they manage. See Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of
Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 301–02 (2009) (noting that the hedge fund structure
closely aligns the interests of the fund manager with those of investors). In addition, a hedge
fund adviser’s poor performance may result in liquidation of the fund or difficulty in raising
capital for successive funds. See Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge
Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 262 (2009)
(noting that market discipline, coupled with the tendency of fund managers to invest in the
funds they manage, reduces agency costs). Hedge fund advisers also typically charge perform-
ance fees for gains in fund performance, but are not required to rebate fees for losses. Public
mutual fund advisers, by contrast, may only charge performance fees where gains and losses
have a symmetric effect on compensation. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b–5(a)(1) (2006); 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.205-3 (2006); see also Robert C. Illig, The Promise of Hedge Fund Governance: How
Incentive Compensation can Enhance Institutional Investor Monitoring, 60 ALA. L. REV. 41,
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better able to manage them at lower cost, and so provide a less expensive
alternative to traditional intermediaries.180 Accordingly, a change in regula-
tion—simply freezing the division among financial firms—is unlikely to
halt change in the financial markets.
This is, at its heart, the principal problem with the Volcker Rule. The
FSOC Study acknowledges the problem, but confines its focus (consistent
with the Volcker Rule) to the effect of market change on proprietary trad-
ing.181 Yet, the same concern applies equally to introducing a static divide—
between proprietary trading and banking—within changing financial mar-
kets. As Justice William O. Douglas, writing about continuity in the law,
observed over sixty years ago:
Th[e] search for static security—in the law or elsewhere—is mis-
guided. The fact is that security can only be achieved through con-
stant change, through the wise discarding of old ideas that have
outlived their usefulness, and through the adapting of others to
current facts. There is only an illusion of safety in a Maginot Line.
Social forces like armies can sweep around a fixed position and
make it untenable. A position that can be shifted to meet such
forces and at least partly absorb them alone gives hope of
security.182
The same can be said of the financial markets. Bank functions may now
be performed by non-bank entities—such as the outsourcing of credit risk
management to hedge funds. Financial risk may be bought and sold among
new market participants, some of whom may be subject to lower levels of
regulation than banks. What this suggests is that regulators must begin to
address the banking industry’s exposure to market-based risks. Banking ac-
tivities may still be affected by proprietary trading—an end-run around the
Volcker Rule’s divide—but now through the banks’ reliance on risk out-
sourcing to hedge funds and the hedge fund industry.183
At the same time, because it focuses only on proprietary trading, there
are likely to be real limits on the Volcker Rule’s ability to address problems
that led up to the financial crisis. The Volcker Rule leaves open the banks’
ability to continue to pursue substantially riskier activities—including, for
70–77 (2008) (describing the role of the “carried-interest” compensation scheme employed by
most hedge funds in reducing agency costs).
180 See Peter A. Diamond, The Role of a Stock Market in a General Equilibrium Model
with Technological Uncertainty, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 759, 770 (1967) (noting that market
mechanisms, because of uncertainty and the possibility for rapid change, are more well-suited
to efficiently allocate resources than other nonmarket mechanisms); Gilson & Whitehead,
supra note 93 at 243–47 (describing the capital markets’ response to increasing demand for
risk mitigation instruments).
181 See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. R
182 William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 735 (1949) (noting that
the respect for precedent must also take account of the “dynamic component of history”).
183 See supra notes 151–60 and accompanying text. R
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example, the extension of subprime real estate loans.184 The Rule also fails to
cover longer-term commitments, which were reported to have been a signifi-
cant source of bank losses—perhaps more significant than losses from short-
term trading.185 In addition, in light of the difficulty in separating proprietary
from permitted activities, the Rule may be applied inconsistently from bank
to bank, potentially creating arbitrage opportunities that fail to minimize ac-
tual risk-taking.186 Finally, there is a risk the Rule will inadvertently block or
limit beneficial activities. The most notable concern is with market-making,
which may be restricted by an overly-broad definition of proprietary trad-
ing.187 Innovation, even if consistent with the Rule, may also be slowed if
there is a risk it will be perceived by regulators as violating a metric or
pattern of trading used to detect impermissible activities.188
This argues, at least initially, for a narrow definition of proprietary trad-
ing. Consistent with the Volcker Rule, activities that are clearly proprietary
should be expressly identified and prohibited.189 Other activities should be
permitted, but subject to continued monitoring and supervision. Federal reg-
ulators may, in the interim, direct that certain of the permitted activities be
segregated from banks in separately capitalized entities as an additional pro-
tection against the impact of trading on bank stability.190 Over time, with
additional data—and a clearer picture of the impact of the new regulation—
regulators may then decide to restrict or prohibit additional trading. Some of
the adjustments may occur during the period leading up to the Rule’s initial
implementation.  Others may take place after the Rule has become effective,
reflecting a greater need for data, over a longer period, to assess the impact
of the new requirements.  Doing so gradually would also allow banks and
regulators to fine tune the detailed metrics that are likely to be used in sepa-
rating proprietary from permissible activities.191 In the meantime, regula-
tors—using the same metrics—could impose capital charges and other
quantitative limits that control the impact of those activities on the banking
industry, consistent with the approach taken in regulating systemically im-
portant non-bank financial firms.192 A reliance on capital charges and other
limits would also be more flexible, allowing regulators, on a step-by-step
basis, to assess the follow-on impact of the new restrictions they impose.
Hedge funds, for example, may grow more important as additional risk-tak-
184 See supra notes 9–10, 21 and accompanying text. R
185 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. R
186 See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. R
187 See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. R
188 See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. R
189 The FSOC Study identifies activities that would clearly be prohibited under the
Volcker Act. See FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 27–28. R
190 This approach would be consistent with the Swap Pushout Rule, which prohibits a
commercial bank from engaging in a swaps trading business, but permits it in bank affiliates.
See supra note 12. R
191 See supra notes 62–70 and accompanying text. R
192 See supra notes 5, 53 and accompanying text. R
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ing becomes concentrated in a single industry. Making that assessment over
time may be less disruptive than attempting to do so in parallel with the new
Volcker Rule requirements.193
There remains an open question about hedge fund regulation. That issue
will need to be addressed, in light of the potential impact of hedge funds on
the financial markets, irrespective of how the Volcker Rule is implemented.
Hedge funds that engage in a credit-related business may become subject to
new rules under proposals to regulate the “shadow banking” system.194 Im-
plementing them, however, will require a different approach to regulating
hedge funds than the capital markets-based approach that has been adopted
to date.195 That does not necessarily suggest a need to regulate hedge funds
in the same way as banks. Different structures, and varying agency and other
costs,196 may make differences in regulation appropriate, even if the func-
tions are similar.197 In that respect, the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the FSOC
to regulate new sources of market risk, which could include hedge funds that
expose banks to prohibited activities.198 Rather than a flat prohibition, how-
ever, the FSOC may consider more fluid regulation, like capital charges, that
reflect the potential systemic importance of hedge fund failure.199
VI. CONCLUSION
The Volcker Rule, this Article has argued, fails to properly take account
of change in the financial markets. A principal goal of the Rule is to mini-
mize risky trading by banks—by prohibiting banking entities from engaging
in proprietary trading—and, therefore, to promote the provision of capital to
businesses and consumers. As a result of the Rule, however, many of those
trading activities have moved to the hedge fund industry. Properly segre-
gated, transferring risk away from banks may limit the impact of a downturn
in hedge fund performance. That fails, however, to take account of new rela-
tionships that have developed within fluid financial markets. Over the past
193 No doubt, there will be political pressure on federal regulators to implement the
Volcker Rule quickly and as comprehensively as possible. See Senators Call, supra note 6. R
Establishing procedures for implementing the Volcker Rule, including clear milestones, may
be one way to demonstrate the regulators’ commitment to doing so, but without the potential
side-effects of the rushed introduction of new regulation that may be too broad or not broad
enough.
194 See Carla Main, Shadow Banks, Dodd-Frank, UBS Notice: Compliance, BLOOMBERG,
Feb. 7, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-07/shadow-banking-dodd-frank-de
lays-ubs-wells-notice-compliance.html.
195 See supra notes 163–70 and accompanying text. R
196 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. R
197 See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM 29
(Jan. 2009), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-012909-report-regulatoryreform.
pdf (noting that “[f]unctional regulation can mean applying the same principles and not nec-
essarily producing identical regulatory outcomes”); see also Whitehead, Reframing, supra
note 16, at 41–43 (arguing that a strict function-only approach to regulation is inappropriate). R
198 See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text. R
199 See supra notes 5, 53 and accompanying text. R
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thirty years, new market participants—in many cases, hedge funds—have
begun to perform bank-like functions that permit banks to extend more
credit or do so at lower cost. By causing proprietary trading to move to the
hedge fund industry, banks continue to be exposed to the same risks—per-
haps less directly than before, but now in an industry also subject to less
regulation.
More generally, the Volcker Rule reflects the problem of imposing a
static business model on modern financial markets. No doubt, the Volcker
Rule removes proprietary trading from entities with government-subsidized
funding. Less clear is whether an alternative method—one that reflects
change in the financial markets—would be more effective. Perhaps recog-
nizing the problem, the FSOC Study recommends that regulations imple-
menting the Volcker Rule be dynamic and flexible. The problem, however,
is more basic. If the regulatory concern is with proprietary trading, the ques-
tion should not be whether banks are engaged in proprietary trading, but
rather, whether banks and banking activities are exposed to the risks of pro-
prietary trading. Today, the location of those risks extends beyond the bank-
ing industry, reflecting an evolving financial system and change in who is
conducting bank-like activities. By failing to take that change into account,
the Volcker Rule potentially results in new and costly regulation that in-
creases risk-taking among less-regulated entities but may still affect banking
activities.
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